

**Choosing to Compete, Determined to Lose:**

The Impact of U.S. Foreign Policy in Central Asia  
on U.S.-Russian Relations

David Siegel  
Advanced Independent Research Project  
Professor Carolyn Kissane  
April 17, 2007

## Table of Contents

Abstract. . . . .	3
Introduction. . . . .	4
Background. . . . .	10
The United States in Central Asia after 9/11: “The War on Terror”. . . . .	21
Building an American Sphere of Influence in Central Asia. . . . .	26
Losing Russia, Losing Central Asia. . . . .	33
Competing for Energy Resources in Central Asia . . . . .	40
Ownership and Control of Caspian Sea Oil. . . . .	43
Pipeline Politics. . . . .	47
Losing Kazakhstan?. . . . .	53
Conclusion. . . . .	56
Bibliography. . . . .	59

## **Abstract**

The convergence of U.S. and Russian interests in Central Asia, which were highlighted by the events of September 11, 2001, failed to provide an impetus for a new U.S.-Russian partnership. Instead, opportunities for cooperation have been transcended by an enduring Cold War mindset among U.S. decision makers: Russia is an adversary with neo-imperial ambitions, not a potential U.S. partner. Reflecting this thinking, American foreign policy in Central Asia has been fashioned as a new containment policy and is driven by the perceived need to minimize the scope of Russia's regional power and influence. The realization of America's policy objectives would make the Central Asian states, and therefore the strategic energy resources of the Caspian Sea, protectorates of the United States and "safe" from Russian "subversion."

But as the outcome of U.S. policy makes clear, attempts to marginalize Russia have led to a weaker American position in Central Asia, not a stronger one. The deep and indelible cultural and historical links—in addition to geographic realities—that have bound Moscow to the region for the last three centuries remain significant, and continue to exclude Washington. Paradoxically, the outcome of U.S. policy has proven to be the exact opposite of what was intended. In a zero-sum competition for power and influence in Central Asia, the United States is losing not only Russia, but Central Asia as well.

## Introduction

In the early 1990s American policy makers and commentators celebrated the collapse of the Soviet Union as the birth of “a new world order.”<sup>1</sup> This new era, it was believed, would lack the great-power rivalries that had characterized most of modern history. According to one author, it was so significant as to represent “the end of history” itself.<sup>2</sup>

In the absence of ideological competition between capitalism and communism, prospects for friendly U.S.-Russian relations, and even a strategic partnership, seemed promising. But today, almost twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, U.S.-Russian relations are at an historic low. Hopes for a meaningful U.S.-Russian partnership are increasingly out of date as the two states compete for power and influence across the globe. In the place of cooperation is a reemergence of the zero-sum competition and generally poor relations that characterized U.S.-Russian relations during the Soviet era. Remarkably, we are witnessing what some have described as a “new Cold War.”<sup>3</sup>

The harsh rhetoric coming from the highest levels of both governments is not merely evidence of this new reality, but is itself a form of Cold War revivalism contributing to an increasingly bitter relationship. In early 2005, U.S. Senator John McCain advised that Russia be excluded from the G-8 and accused Vladimir Putin of behaving “like a spoiled child” for backsliding on democracy at home and opposing U.S. interests abroad.<sup>4</sup> Marking Russia as a neo-imperial power McCain commented that

---

<sup>1</sup> George H.W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, September 11, 1990, <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1990/90091101.html> viewed March 5, 2007.

<sup>2</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, Inc., 1992.)

<sup>3</sup> For example: Ian Bremmer, “The Dawn of the Next Cold War,” *Newsweek*, February 26, 2007.; Stephen F. Cohen, “The New American Cold War,” *The Nation*, July 6, 2006.

<sup>4</sup> John McCain, Transcript of Interview with Chris Wallace, Fox News Sunday, February 28, 2005, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,148875,00.html> viewed February 22, 2007.

“every step [Putin] takes seems to be headed toward a restoration of the old Russian empire,” which cannot be tolerated by the United States.<sup>5</sup> In May 2006, Vice President Dick Cheney characterized Russian actions, both at home and abroad, as being “counterproductive” and having a negative impact on its foreign relations.<sup>6</sup> According to Cheney, Vladimir Putin had instituted policies which sought to “undermine the territorial integrity” of its neighbors, actions which “no one can justify.”<sup>7</sup>

President Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, has expressed nostalgia for Russia’s former great power status, lamenting the dissolution of the Soviet Union as the “major geopolitical disaster of the century.”<sup>8</sup> Decrying the one-sided predominance of power in the post-Cold War world, Putin criticized American foreign policy as “an almost uncontrolled hyper use of force [...] force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts.”<sup>9</sup> The United States, said Putin, “has overstepped its national borders in every way,” and is imposing its policies on the rest of the world.<sup>10</sup>

Behind this increasingly frequent rhetoric lay major divergences in the two states’ national interests. On almost every major issue in the international arena the United States and Russia have taken different, often oppositional approaches.

In Eastern Europe and the Caucasus the United States continues to support the enlargement of NATO despite consistent Russian objections that “it represents a serious

---

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Dick Cheney, Remarks at the 2006 Vilnius Conference, Reval Hotel Lietuva, Vilnius, Lithuania, May 4, 2006, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060504-1.html> viewed February 26, 2007.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Vladimir Putin, Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,” April 25, 2005, [http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031\\_type70029type82912\\_87086.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml) viewed March 5, 2007.

<sup>9</sup> Vladimir Putin, Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2007, [http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138\\_type82912type82914type82917type84779\\_118135.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118135.shtml) viewed February 12, 2007.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.”<sup>11</sup> While U.S. and NATO officials offer their assurances that enlargement is not directed against Moscow, the Russians are left wondering, “against whom is this expansion intended?”<sup>12</sup> Additionally, the United States continues to develop a robust missile defense system despite Russia’s concerns that this undermines its defense capabilities and threatens global security. America’s proposed missile defense system includes the positioning of infrastructure in former Soviet bloc states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics in the Caucasus, suggesting to the Kremlin a deliberate encirclement of Moscow.<sup>13</sup>

On Middle East policy, major tensions between U.S. and Russian interests became visible with Moscow’s opposition to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Differences over policy have diverged even further since then. Russia has consistently resisted U.S.-led attempts to impose tough U.N. sanctions on Iran, and more generally, to isolate it. In addition to using its seat on the U.N. Security Council to weaken or block sanctions, Russia continues to provide Tehran with assistance in developing its Bushehr nuclear power plant. Moreover, Moscow has increased its weapons sales to both Iran and Syria, in addition to China and Venezuela, surpassing the United States as the world’s largest arms dealer in the developing world and raising concerns in Washington.<sup>14</sup> The U.S. subsequently lambasted Russia for providing “lethal military equipment” to “state

---

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Russia Seeks ‘Clear Answers’ On Missile Defense,” March 6, 2007, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/03/da22563c-3955-4f31-af92-b74fa6b1a483.html> viewed March 6, 2007; “U.S. Wants to Put Radar in Caucasus,” *The New York Times*, March 2, 2007, World Briefing, Page A6.

<sup>14</sup> Richard F. Grimmett, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998-2005,” Report for Congress, October 23, 2006.

sponsors of terrorism” and imposed sanctions on Russian defense firms, leading to threats of Russian reciprocity and a general deterioration in relations.<sup>15</sup>

In the Caucasus, the United States has established close ties with the former Soviet state of Georgia and continues to offer military, diplomatic, and political support in its efforts to control the separatist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These separatist movements, however, are supported by Moscow. Conversely, Russia maintains its support for the continued rule of Kosovo by Serbia while the United States supports its independence. In these and other instances, political self-determination has become a deeply political issue on which Washington and Moscow rarely agree.

More than once, Russia has halted its energy exports to inflict political punishment on its neighbors, raising concerns in the U.S. and Europe that Russia poses a threat to international energy security. In addition to regularly criticizing this newly found display of Russian power, the United States has voiced complaints about the lack of openness and transparency in the Russian energy sector. Russia has recently excluded Western companies from previously established production sharing agreements and renationalized a number of its energy assets.

In addition to these prominent and widely discussed cases, a major fault line between the U.S. and Russia has arisen in Central Asia. Although it has received comparatively little attention, differences in Central Asia policy have been a significant source of friction and mistrust between Washington and Moscow, particularly since 9/11. As one analyst observes, the U.S. and Russia “increasingly appear to be at cross

---

<sup>15</sup> “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Russian Firm,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Russian Foreign Policy and Security Watch, Volume 4, Number 38, September 25, 2003.; Nabi Abdullaev, “Kremlin Warns of Strain in U.S. Ties,” Moscow Times, August 8, 2006.

purposes” in the region.<sup>16</sup> In this regard, the case of U.S.-Russian competition in Central Asia is typical, or as Daniel Kimmage notes, it “provides a window on the dynamics that dominate the two countries’ uneasy relationship.”<sup>17</sup> But unlike other areas of disagreement, U.S. and Russian interests in Central Asia have a great deal in common. For example, both states seek to combat terrorist organizations and stifle the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Moreover, the two countries had pledged, in the immediate aftermath of September 11, to engage in “active cooperation and coordination” in doing so.<sup>18</sup>

The United States, however, has disregarded this convergence of interests and has missed an opportunity to cultivate a fundamental change in its relations with Russia. Rather, U.S. foreign policy in Central Asia has been premised on the same assumptions that informed policy during the Cold War: first, that Russia is an adversary, not a partner; second, that Russia has a proclivity for neo-imperialism and regional domination which the United States must act to prevent. Not surprisingly, then, U.S. policy today bears a striking resemblance to the containment policy of the Cold War era and is driven by the perceived need to keep Russia safely within its present borders. Inversely, and in practice, this means keeping Russia out of its neighbors’ affairs; in this case, those of Central Asia. Thus, U.S. military bases in Central Asia, established with the primary purpose of supporting military operations in Afghanistan, have serviced an additional

---

<sup>16</sup> Robert McMahon, “Central Asia: Russia and U.S. Often at Odds in Region,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 25, 2005, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/10/cda56301-ff55-4a4f-b4ad-110d147d2df8.html> viewed March 5, 2007.

<sup>17</sup> Daniel Kimmage, “Central Asia Provides Window on Russia-U.S. Relations,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, RFE/RL Newslines, Volume 9, Number 36, End Note, February 24, 2005.

<sup>18</sup> Joint Statement on Counterterrorism by the President of the United States and the President of Russia, Shanghai, China, October 21, 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011022-11.html> viewed February 16, 2007.

objective: to marginalize Russia and displace it from its centuries-old role as the region's leader and security guarantor. Protecting Central Asian states from perceived Russian irredentism has entailed attempts at making Central Asia part of America's sphere of influence.

But America's attempt to change the regional status quo raises a larger question. Russia has dominated Central Asia since the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Why is the United States suddenly concerned that it continues to do so? In answering this question, it is impossible to ignore the vast energy resources of the Caspian Sea basin, which constitute some of the largest undeveloped energy reserves world-wide. In addition to seeking a hand in developing these resources, the United States has sought to de-monopolize existing export infrastructure, currently controlled by Moscow. This means downgrading Russia's regional relevance while establishing a crucial role for the United States. Talk of cooperating with Russia in these ventures, as with talk of cooperation in security issues, has quickly been subordinated to the objective of marginalizing Russian influence in the region.

Contrary to what U.S. decision makers had planned, though, Russian influence in Central Asia has shown itself to be impossibly difficult to mitigate. Moreover, the Central Asian states themselves are less eager partners than the United States first imagined. In choosing to engage in a zero-sum competition with Russia in its own backyard, Washington has not only sacrificed having good relations with Moscow, but is increasingly finding the returns of this trade-off—measured in geopolitical power and influence—to be meager and still diminishing.

## I -- Background

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, American policy makers were presented with the numerous challenges of a bipolar world, most important of which was formulating a new strategy for managing U.S.-Soviet relations. While there was reasonable certainty that the Soviet Union would not be a close U.S. ally, it remained unclear as to what level of cooperation would exist, if any. Moreover, U.S. decision makers debated the relative merits of an openly hostile and aggressive stance versus a more patient and defensive one.<sup>19</sup> In 1947 George Kennan gave what would become the definitive answer to all of these questions. Describing communism's ideological antagonism towards capitalism, and the seemingly historic inability of the Russians to see "the possibilities of permanent and peaceful coexistence of rival forces," Kennan argued that there could be "no appeal to common purposes" nor to "common mental approaches."<sup>20</sup> In other words, cooperation with the Soviet Union was not a plausible strategy. The United States, wrote Kennan, "must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not as a partner in the political arena."<sup>21</sup> In addition, he emphasized the Russian leadership's patience, and their keen sense of their own and others' power. Highlighting these two factors—the implausibility of cooperation with Russia, combined with its own acute instinct for survival—Kennan laid out what would become the backbone of America's foreign policy over the following forty-four years: "it is clear that the main

---

<sup>19</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005) pages 15-30.

<sup>20</sup> George Kennan (writing as "X"), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 25, 1946-1947, pages 568, 574.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, page 580.

element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”<sup>22</sup>

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 seemed to render containment policy obsolete. Suddenly, the United States was presented with the opportunity to reshape its foreign policy and reconstruct its relationship with Russia. Bill Clinton sought to capitalize on this opportunity and during the early years of his administration a new post-Soviet policy emerged. This policy was based on the vision of a strategic U.S.-Russian partnership.

President Clinton saw support for Russia, in its quest for political and economic reform, as a “first-order concern” for the United States because it gave the U.S. “the opportunity to complete the movement from having an adversary [...] to having a partner” in the international arena.<sup>23</sup> A major feature of Clinton’s Russia policy was the primacy given to Russia in America’s engagement with the entire former Soviet Union (FSU), earning it the colloquial title “Russia first.” In America’s dealings with the FSU, Russia was, according to President Clinton, “the heart of it all.”<sup>24</sup> Thus, the vast majority of aid, activity, and attention would be directed towards Moscow. For example, Russia was by far the single largest recipient of a six-fold increase in U.S. aid to the newly independent states in 1994.<sup>25</sup> While Washington recognized and supported the independence of the other fourteen states, they would remain secondary, and tethered to Moscow. As Strobe Talbott said later, this thinking was based “on the theory that

---

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., page 575.

<sup>23</sup> Bill Clinton, “A Conspectus for Russia’s Entry Into the Global Economy,” Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Annapolis, Maryland, April 1, 1993. The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches and Commentary, Eds. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Albina Shayevich, and Boris Zlotnikov, (Armonk, London: M.E. Sharpe, 2000)

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> James M. Goldgeier, and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy toward Russia after the Cold War, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003) pages 91-95.

success there [in Russia] would help lift the other former republics out of their own troubles.”<sup>26</sup> But, in addition, it could not have been lost on Washington that a “Russia first” approach necessarily required limited engagement with the rest of the newly independent states. In part, securing a U.S.-Russian partnership required the United States to have an awareness of, and respect for, Russia’s historical sphere of influence. Friendly U.S.-Russian relations demanded looser ties between the United States and other former Soviet republics.<sup>27</sup> Thus, America’s relationship and engagement with the states in the Baltic region, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia remained peripheral.

This approach had some early success in changing the fundamental character of U.S.-Russian relations. After a joint summit in 1993, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin pronounced “a comprehensive strategy of cooperation,” and an intention to “give fresh impetus to development of the U.S.-Russian relationship in all of its dimensions.”<sup>28</sup> The two leaders later reaffirmed these principles in Moscow, and then went further, declaring that “the relationship between the United States and Russia has entered a new stage of mature strategic partnership based on equality, mutual advantage, and recognition of each other’s national interests.”<sup>29</sup> In a policy shift unthinkable during the Cold War, the U.S. and Russian Presidents articulated “the need to create a new European security order that is inclusive, non-discriminatory and focused on practical political and security

---

<sup>26</sup> Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy*, (New York: Random House, 2002) page 69.

<sup>27</sup> Shahram Akbarzadeh, *Uzbekistan and the United States: Authoritarianism, Islamism & Washington’s Security Agenda*, (London & New York: Zed Books, 2005) page 57.

<sup>28</sup> “Vancouver Declaration” The 1<sup>st</sup> Clinton-Yeltsin Summit, April 3-4, 1993, Vancouver, Canada, <http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/summits1.htm> viewed January 31, 2007.

<sup>29</sup> “Moscow Declaration” The 2<sup>nd</sup> Clinton-Yeltsin Summit, January 12-15, 1994, Moscow, Russia, <http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/summits2.htm> viewed February 1, 2007.

cooperation.”<sup>30</sup> In addition, cooperation was pledged in space exploration, economic and political reform, technological development, and energy.<sup>31</sup>

As the 1990s progressed, though, many in the United States began to doubt Russia’s willingness, or even its ability to play the role of a constructive regional leader and U.S. partner. Critics came to see Clinton’s vision for Russia as misguided and groundlessly optimistic. Moreover, cleavages formed in the nascent partnership, beginning with NATO enlargement, intensifying with U.S. intervention in Bosnia, and reaching near-crisis levels with the bombing of Serbia. Increasingly, these problems became hard to ignore. Whereas Clinton’s initial policy sought to have the remaining former members of the Soviet Union follow Russia’s example, critics began to argue that these states needed America’s protection from Russia itself.

Richard Pipes, the preeminent historian on Russia and former Reagan administration official, argued that Russia had “not made a clean break with its Soviet past” and its recognition of independent post-Soviet states was with “the head, not the heart.”<sup>32</sup> According to Pipes, Moscow’s “patrimonial mentality,” was “embedded in the Russian psyche” and presented the United States with “a serious potential threat,” not an opportunity for rapprochement.<sup>33</sup> Likewise, former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, characterized the Clinton policy as overly optimistic, naïve, and based on “historical amnesia.”<sup>34</sup> A failure to build strong relations with the other newly independent states, warned Brzezinski, would leave them under virtual Russian control

---

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.; “Vancouver Declaration”

<sup>32</sup> Richard Pipes, “Is Russia Still an Enemy?” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 76, Number 5, September/October 1997; pages 67, 71.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., page 73.

<sup>34</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 73, Number 2, March/April 1994; page 78.

thus “forfeit[ing] the long-range fruits of the West’s victory in the Cold War.”<sup>35</sup> Paul Wolfowitz, echoed these sentiments, warning that the Clinton administration’s policy of “Russia first” was “slipping into a dangerous and misguided policy of ‘Russia only.’”<sup>36</sup>

In 2001, William Odom urged the new Bush administration to take an “unvarnished view” of Russia so that it might see a “different reality” than its predecessor.<sup>37</sup> This new reality would make it clear that “Russia cannot be expected to act constructively in international affairs” and that it maintained a proclivity to “engage in trouble-making diplomacy” in the former Soviet Union.<sup>38</sup> Odom’s view of Russia soon became dominant. Incoming National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, for example, held on to the long-standing assumptions that had dominated Cold War thinking. During the 2000 Presidential campaign she complained that the Clinton administration “has found it exceedingly difficult” to define the country’s national interest, and argued that Moscow was “determined to assert itself in the world and often does so in ways that are at once haphazard and threatening to American interests.”<sup>39</sup>

Particularly noteworthy about Wolfowitz and Rice is that they, in addition to Dick Cheney, I. Lewis Libby, and Robert Gates, had been advocating a more adversarial policy towards Russia since the late Reagan and early Bush eras.<sup>40</sup> Wolfowitz and Rice were a minority in the George H.W. Bush administration, consistently raising doubts

---

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Paul D. Wolfowitz, “Clinton’s First Year,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 73, Number 1, January/February 1994, page 41.

<sup>37</sup> William E. Odom, “Realism about Russia,” *The National Interest*, Number 65 (Fall 2001); page 56.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., page 57.

<sup>39</sup> Condoleezza Rice, “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 79, Number 1, January/February 2000.

<sup>40</sup> James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet*, London: The Penguin Group, 2004; pages 168-173.

about the conventional wisdom that the Soviet Union was changing.<sup>41</sup> But perhaps even more relevant is that they were the “two top campaign advisers for foreign policy” to Presidential candidate George W. Bush.<sup>42</sup> Subsequently, they became top advisors and policy makers in the Bush White House, and their influence was clear from the beginning. In one of George W. Bush’s earliest speeches on foreign policy, he warned that “a return to Russian imperialism would endanger both Russian democracy and the states on Russia’s borders,” and advised that “The United States should actively support the nations of the Baltics, the Caucasus and Central Asia.”<sup>43</sup> In accepting his nomination at the Republican National Convention in 2000, Bush criticized the Clinton administration as having “squandered” America’s Cold War victory, and declared that “[the Clinton] administration had its chance. They have not led. We will.”<sup>44</sup>

The policy ideas articulated by George Bush in 1999 and 2000 were similar to what “Russia first” critics had been proposing for sometime. A major focus of these proposals called for active engagement with the former Soviet republics, including the five newly independent states of Central Asia. Zbigniew Brzezinski suggested that a new grand strategy be adopted, the primary goal of which “should be the consolidation of geopolitical *pluralism* within the former Soviet Union.”<sup>45</sup> In implementing the policy of “pluralism,” Brzezinski suggested “a more visible American show of interest in the

---

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> George W. Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism,” Speech given at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm> viewed February 9, 2007.

<sup>44</sup> George W. Bush, Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention, Philadelphia, August 3, 2000, <http://www.2000gop.com/convention/speech/speechbush.html> viewed February 9, 2007.

<sup>45</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 73, Number 2, March/April 1994; page 79, emphasis added.

independence of the Central Asian states.”<sup>46</sup> Likewise, S. Frederick Starr, pointing towards the importance of independence for the states of Central Asia, argued for increased U.S. engagement with Uzbekistan, a potential regional leader.<sup>47</sup> Condoleezza Rice saw the independence of the former Soviet states to be in America’s interest and with U.S. support, she claimed, they “will be less tempting to Russia.”<sup>48</sup>

A common theme in these suggestions, and one that has become a major force behind much of America’s foreign policy in Central Asia, is the idea of “independence” and “sovereignty” for the former Soviet republics. Just as Condoleezza Rice declared the “independence” of the newly independent states to be an American interest in 2000, Richard Boucher, Rice’s current Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian affairs, describes “sovereign and independent states” in Central Asia as “the overall goal” of U.S. policy today.<sup>49</sup> Steven R. Mann, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, says that “robust U.S. engagement” in Central Asia is needed to “provide the political space for the countries of the region to pursue their national self-interests.”<sup>50</sup> Lastly, Jim Nichol, an American specialist in Russia and Central Asian Affairs, noted in a report for Congress that a major goal of U.S. foreign policy in Central Asia was

---

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., page 80

<sup>47</sup> S. Frederick Starr, “Making Eurasia Stable,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 75, Number 1, January/February 1996.

<sup>48</sup> Condoleezza Rice, “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 79, Number 1, January/February 2000.

<sup>49</sup> Richard A. Boucher, Briefing of the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission), Federal News Service, September 26, 2006.

<sup>50</sup> Steven R. Mann, “Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia,” Testimony before the United States House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, July 25, 2006.

“strengthening the independence of the Central Asian states,” while preventing “other efforts to subvert them.”<sup>51</sup>

Engagement with the former Soviet republics, in this case those of Central Asia, has not only been given higher priority than U.S.-Russian partnership, but rests on the premise that Russia cannot, or will not, play a constructive role in the region. While in the early 1990s Russia was at the center of U.S. policy, today Boucher says that “above everything else in this region, we put Central Asians at the center of our policy.”<sup>52</sup> Indeed, current policy indicates a substantial departure from that of the early 1990s. The very notion of supporting the “independence” and “sovereignty” of the Central Asian states, although rarely stated explicitly, is based on the now unquestioned assumption that Russia’s primary objective is to seek their subservience.

But, in unraveling the implications of an independent Central Asia, a contradiction emerges. If the “viability” of independent Central Asian states is “uncertain” without U.S. support,<sup>53</sup> then they are not independent at all; rather, they are dependent on either the United States or Russia. Put more clearly, and closer in line with the U.S. policy formulation, the states of Central Asia are dependent on the United States to achieve their independence from Russia. As Richard Boucher said recently, “We need to help them have their independence secure.”<sup>54</sup> The answer to the question—secure from what?—is not stated explicitly, but implied. It is clear that the “independence” of

---

<sup>51</sup> Jim Nichol, “Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, November 16, 2006.

<sup>52</sup> Richard A. Boucher, Briefing of the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission), Federal News Service, September 26, 2006.

<sup>53</sup> Brzezinski’s formulation.

<sup>54</sup> Richard A. Boucher, Interfax Interview, October 11, 2006, <http://www.interfax.com/17/201475/interview.aspx> viewed February 24, 2007.

Central Asian states sought by U.S. policy makers is merely a euphemistic description of the realignment of power and influence in the region from Moscow to Washington.

Three years after Zbigniew Brzezinski introduced the idea of “pluralism” he developed it further, making explicit some of the assumptions that are now underlying official U.S. policy. “Geopolitical pluralism in Eurasia,” says Brzezinski, will “[prevent] the emergence of a hostile coalition that could challenge America’s primacy” and “ensure that no state or combination of states gains the ability to expel the United States or even diminish its decisive role.”<sup>55</sup> Indeed, American dominance of Eurasia—Brzezinski’s idea of “pluralism,” given major asymmetries in power—would give the United States the ability to “exercise decisive influence over two of the world’s three most economically productive regions.”<sup>56</sup> While a cooperative relationship with Russia is “desirable,” says Brzezinski, America must “send a clear message about its global priorities.”<sup>57</sup> In emphasizing the importance of post-Soviet independence, he advocates that Russia be divided up into three “loosely” confederated republics so that, among other things, it “would be less susceptible to imperial mobilization.”<sup>58</sup> Finally, “pursuing geopolitical pluralism should also entail a more deliberate expansion of the scope and perimeter of European security.”<sup>59</sup>

These policy proposals, and others like them, are different from containment policy in only two significant ways: the territory to which “Russian expansive

---

<sup>55</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Geostategy for Eurasia,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 76, Number 5, September/October 1997.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 73, Number 2, March/April 1994; page 81.

tendencies”<sup>60</sup> must now be contained is much smaller, while the asymmetry in power between the United States and Russia is much greater. Echoing Brzezinski, then-Presidential candidate George W. Bush said “[a]ll our goals in Eurasia will depend on America strengthening the alliances that sustain our influence,” as well as “more American leadership” in the region.<sup>61</sup> So as not to leave any ambiguity as to which states were the region’s present and former hegemon, respectively, Bush added that in Eurasia, “[w]e have partners, not satellites.”<sup>62</sup>

A good case can be made, based on the pronouncements of Russian politicians that Russia seeks to regain its global significance, even through territorial aggrandizement and dominance of Central Asia.<sup>63</sup> However, U.S. policy makers and scholars, beginning with critics of Clinton’s Russia policy, have gone so far as to interpret every Russian action in the region as irredentism. As a result, practical notions of national self-interest have been obscured and transcended by the new truism that Russia’s actions are always harmful, while America’s are always helpful. This makes U.S.-Russian cooperation impracticable, and perhaps even impossible. One prominent example of a failure in partnership, especially given post-9/11 hindsight, demonstrates that the quickness to view Russia with suspicion has helped to obscure common interests.

Vladimir Lukin, Russia’s former ambassador to the United States, wrote as early as 1992 that “Russia and America have enough common and parallel interests for a partnership” and that Russia could play a major role in helping to “contain both Islamic

---

<sup>60</sup> George Kennan (writing as “X”), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 25, 1946-1947.

<sup>61</sup> George W. Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism,” Speech given at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm> viewed February 9, 2007.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> See for example Boris Rumer, “Central Asia at the End of the Transition,” Central Asia at the End of the Transition, Ed. Boris Rumer, (Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2005) pages 39-64.

fundamentalism and conflicts resulting from ethnic and religious rivalries” on its periphery.<sup>64</sup> But some in the U.S. argued that it was Russia, not Islamic fundamentalism that needed to be contained. While Lukin believed that “Russia faces serious or potentially serious problems”<sup>65</sup> with the countries on its periphery, for example, those of Central Asia, Richard Pipes argued that this perceived “threat” actually gave Moscow an opportunity “for exploiting instability on its borders.”<sup>66</sup> Bigger borders means that there is a greater chance for expansion, not that there are more threats to guard against, according to Pipes, in essence de-legitimizing any action Russia might take in a genuine interest of self-defense or regional security.

Indeed, criticizing the Russian military presence on the Tajik-Afghan border in 1996, Pipes said that Russia’s threat to intervene against “hard-line Islamist Taliban units from Afghanistan” would constitute a “modified Brezhnev Doctrine.”<sup>67</sup> The suggested policy response for such brazen imperialism: “toughness [...] the world must not acquiesce to a new Brezhnev Doctrine.”<sup>68</sup> Likewise, analyst Dimitri Simes argued that “tough talk is very much in order” because “the fundamental direction of Russian foreign policy causes concern” and “suggests neo-imperial assertiveness.”<sup>69</sup> What had offended Simes was Russia’s extension of military support to the independent Tajik government, which was then engaged in a civil war against Islamic radicals. In 1999, then-governor Bush announced, in an early speech on foreign policy, that “We want to cooperate with

---

<sup>64</sup> Vladimir P. Lukin, “Our Security Predicament,” *Foreign Policy*, Number 88 (Autumn, 1992), pp. 57-75.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Richard Pipes, “Is Russia Still an Enemy?” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 76, Number 5, September/October 1997.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Dimitri K. Simes, “Clinton Must Talk Tough to the Russians,” *St. Louis Post*, May 7, 1995, p. O3.B.

Russia on its concern with terrorism, but that is impossible unless Moscow operates with civilized self-restraint.”<sup>70</sup>

Writing in 2003, with the hindsight of September 11 and puzzled as to why the Clinton administration seemed so reluctant to take Vladimir Putin’s concerns about Osama bin Laden more seriously, Dimitri Simes concluded that among other things, Clinton didn’t want to acquiesce and let Russia regain its foothold in Central Asia.<sup>71</sup> But given the events of September 11, Simes, unlike others, has seen the purposelessness of continuing to treat Russia as an adversary and competitor in Central Asia: “we must ask ourselves what perverse logic would lead one to believe that America can treat Putin as an opponent and work to preclude Russia from playing a role in its own neighborhood while expecting the Kremlin to accommodate American priorities.”<sup>72</sup> It seems, based on U.S. foreign policy in Central Asia since September 11 that the Bush administration has not undergone the same change in thinking.

## **II -- The United States in Central Asia after 9/11: “The War on Terror”**

Geographical proximity to Afghanistan has long made terrorism and Islamic radicalism top policy concerns for Moscow. Islamic radicalism in Afghanistan, which had been developing since the Soviet invasion of 1979, culminated with the rise of the Taliban in 1996 and threatened to metastasize and destabilize the entire region. Additionally, the absence of Soviet authority throughout Muslim Central Asia, the geographic buffer between Afghanistan and Russia, facilitated the spread of radical Islam

---

<sup>70</sup> George W. Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism,” Speech given at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm> viewed February 9, 2007.

<sup>71</sup> Dimitri K. Simes, “Realism: It’s High Minded and It Works,” *The National Interest*, Winter 2003/04.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

into that region, where it historically did not exist.<sup>73</sup> Within a short time of the Taliban's rise, radical Islamic groups were thriving in the Fergana Valley, the jigsaw-puzzle-like junction of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, in the former Soviet Union.

While these trends were themselves unsettling, it was the impact that this ascendant Islamic ideology had on the Russian republics in the North Caucasus that raised the greatest concerns in Moscow. Conspicuously, the centuries-long struggle of Chechen and Ingush nationalists to win independence from Russia soon took on an Islamic slant, as money, materiel, and even personnel began flowing in from Central Asia, Afghanistan, and the Middle East.<sup>74</sup>

At the vanguard of Russia's hard-line, and often brutal response to these new threats, was Vladimir Putin. Shortly before being appointed Prime Minister in August 1999, Putin declared that "We will pursue the terrorists everywhere [...] And we have to do this today, quickly, decisively, with clenched teeth, strangle the vermin at the root."<sup>75</sup> Bobo Lo argues that the subsequent "securitization" of Russian foreign policy was attributable to Putin's increasing influence and included a more "activist approach" in the FSU.<sup>76</sup> Lena Jonson points out, more specifically, that Putin's ascension in the Kremlin meant that "terrorism was given top priority on the Russian agenda in Central Asia."<sup>77</sup>

---

<sup>73</sup> Tiffany Petros, "Islam in Central Asia: The Emergence and Growth of Radicalism in the Post-Communist Era," In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, Eds. Dan Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2004).

<sup>74</sup> Millard J. Burr and Robert O. Collins, Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World, (Cambridge University Press, 2006) pages 175-182.

<sup>75</sup> Quoted by Sophie Lambroschini, "Russia: Putin's One Theme Is Firmness," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 21, 2000, <http://www.rferl.org/features/2000/03/f.ru.000321142418.asp> viewed February 16, 2007.

<sup>76</sup> Bobo Lo, "The Securitization of Russian Foreign Policy under Putin," Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century, Ed. Gabriel Gorodetsky, (London and Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003) pages 14-17.

<sup>77</sup> Lena Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004) page 1.

As mentioned previously, Russia had viewed the issue of Islamic terrorism to be one of mutual concern with the United States and had seen it as an area for U.S.-Russian partnership since at least 1992. Nevertheless, the United States consistently failed to see how events in Afghanistan and Central Asia could be of any relevance to its own security, and interpreted Russia's actions there as being more imperialistic than defensive. After the fall of the Soviet Union, when it became apparent that the Soviet-installed and Russian-supported Afghan President, Mohammad Najibullah, would be toppled by Islamic radicals, Najibullah reminded the United States that the Cold War was over and that there was a mutual interest in his success. "We have a common task" with the United States, said Najibullah, "to launch a joint struggle against fundamentalism."<sup>78</sup> If his government fell, he warned, "Afghanistan will be turned into a center for terrorism."<sup>79</sup> Rather than heed this prescient call, Washington registered mild satisfaction that Najibullah, a vestige of Soviet power and influence, would soon be overthrown.<sup>80</sup> Similar warnings from Moscow, during both the Clinton and Bush administrations, were met with the same skepticism, or, at best, disinterest and disconnect. As late as September 9, 2001, Vladimir Putin called President Bush to inform him that a major anti-Taliban leader in Afghanistan, Ahmed Shah Massoud, had been assassinated. The Russians claimed that this was a forewarning that something big would follow, but, as

---

<sup>78</sup> Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004) page 234.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> At the Malta Summit in 1989, an event which is considered to formally mark the end of the Cold War, James Baker insisted that the Soviets stop supporting Najibullah. He told President Gorbachev directly: "Stop your massive assistance to Kabul."

former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov noted, President Bush's "overall reaction indicated that he did not fully grasp the seriousness of the issue."<sup>81</sup>

If Putin's rise to power galvanized the first post-Soviet shift in Russia's Central Asia policy, namely "securitization," then September 11<sup>th</sup> provided impetus for the second such shift: active cooperation with the United States in accomplishing this goal.<sup>82</sup> September 11<sup>th</sup> made the convergence of Russian and American interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia undeniable and a new partnership, crucial. As Putin saw it, Russian efforts at rapprochement with the West, and security policy in Central Asia, heretofore completely unrelated policy areas, would now fuse into one.<sup>83</sup> Cold War competitiveness, it was believed, would soon be obsolete as both East and West took on the same priorities of fighting terrorism and Islamic extremism. As one Russian journalist pointed out, "[t]oday, for the first time since 1945, Russia and the U.S. have a common enemy: the Taliban and bin Laden."<sup>84</sup> The environment seemed perfect for a cooperative partnership, particularly with regards to Central Asia policy.

Exemplifying this new thinking, Putin proclaimed on the day of the 9/11 attacks that it "yet again underscores the importance of Russia's proposals to unite the forces of the international community in the struggle with terror."<sup>85</sup> The immediate reaction in the United States indicated similar thinking. Secretary of State Colin Powell, for example, suggested that September 11<sup>th</sup> ushered in a new era in U.S.-Russian relations, saying that

---

<sup>81</sup> Yevgeny M. Primakov, A World Challenged: Fighting Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004) pages 76-77.

<sup>82</sup> Lena Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004) pages 83-86.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, page 86.

<sup>84</sup> Lidia Andrusenko, "Political Scientists Give Putin Instructions," October 26, 2001, The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Volume 53, No. 43, November 21, 2001; pages 4-5.

<sup>85</sup> Vladimir Putin, Quoted by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, RFE/RL Newslines, September 12, 2001 <http://www.rferl.org/newslines/2001/09/120901.asp#archive> viewed February 16, 2007.

“[n]ot only is the Cold War over, the post-Cold War period is also over.”<sup>86</sup> In this new era, Powell said, “there’s a new strategic opportunity to work with Russia.”<sup>87</sup> Just one month after the attacks Presidents Bush and Putin issued a *Joint Statement on Counterterrorism*, which declared that “[t]he leaders of the two countries view U.S.-Russian cooperation as a critical element in the global effort against terrorism,” and that the United States and Russia would fight terrorism “through active cooperation and coordination, both bilaterally and within the framework of international institutions.”<sup>88</sup> At a joint press conference marking the signing of the statement, President Bush announced that the United States “seeks a new relationship with Russia based on cooperation and mutual interests, instead of confrontation and mutual vulnerability.”<sup>89</sup>

But, in his first ever meeting with Vladimir Putin, George Bush had said that for a post-Cold War U.S.-Russian partnership to be effective “it is important that we not only talk differently, we must also act differently.”<sup>90</sup> As America’s post-9/11 foreign policy made clear, talk of a deep and genuine partnership with Russia was never taken seriously. When actions—not words—are evaluated, it is clear that the United States viewed September 11<sup>th</sup> as an opportunity to put the finishing touches on its Cold War victory, not as an opportunity for strategic cooperation with Moscow. Nowhere is this more evident than in America’s foreign policy in Central Asia where, finally, the United States would

---

<sup>86</sup> Colin L. Powell, Remarks at Business Event in Shanghai, China, October 18, 2001, [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept\\_11/powell\\_brief26.htm](http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/powell_brief26.htm) viewed February 18, 2007.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> Joint Statement on Counterterrorism by the President of the United States and the President of Russia. Shanghai, China, October 21, 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011022-11.html> viewed February 16, 2007.

<sup>89</sup> Press Conference with President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, Shanghai, People’s Republic of China, October 21, 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011021-3.html> viewed February 1, 2007.

<sup>90</sup> Press Conference by President Bush and Russian Federation President Putin. Brdo Pri Kranju, Slovenia, June 16, 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010618.html> viewed January 22, 2007.

be able to vigorously bolster the independence of the states of Central Asia. In other words, dislodge them from Russia's sphere of influence and bring them under America's.

### *Building an American Sphere of Influence in Central Asia*

Crucial to the U.S.-led operation against the Taliban would be basing rights in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the Central Asian states on Afghanistan's northern border. Many leaders in Moscow, however, were strongly opposed to allowing American military bases to be established in the former Soviet Union. The states of Central Asia were not simply former Soviet Republics, but had been a part of the Russian Empire as early as the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Indeed, the perception in the Kremlin was that Central Asia, more than any other region, was still within the Russian sphere of influence and remained of vital strategic importance. Accordingly, major objections were raised to the impending U.S. presence. On September 15 Russia's Defense Minister, Sergei Ivanov, announced that there were "absolutely no grounds, not even hypothetically, for speculating that some sort of NATO military operations could be undertaken on the territory of the Central Asian countries."<sup>91</sup> Meanwhile, Duma Deputy Speaker Vladimir Zhirinovskiy warned that the United States, once allowed in, would "occupy Central Asia."<sup>92</sup> Russia had a clear interest in deposing the Taliban, argued the director of the Institute of CIS Countries, Zatulinskiy Konstantin, "but not at the price of a long-term U.S.

---

<sup>91</sup> Sergei Ivanov, "There will be no military operations on CIS territory," September 15, 2001, The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Volume 53, No. 37, October 10, 2001, pages 5-6; *See also*, Susan Glasser, "Russia Rejects Joint Military Action With United States," Washington Post, September 15, 2001, page A06.

<sup>92</sup> Radio Free Liberty/Radio Liberty, RFE/RL Newslines, September 19, 2001, <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2001/09/1-RUS/rus-190901.asp#archive> viewed February 18, 2007.

presence in the region, not at the price of new American bases near our border.”<sup>93</sup> On September 17, Vladimir Putin began consultations with leaders of the five Central Asian states over how best to cooperate on terrorism,<sup>94</sup> sending the subtle message that Russia would be the regional coordinator through which the United States could participate.

Ultimately, though, Putin was pragmatic enough to realize that the United States would succeed in establishing military bases in Central Asia regardless of Russia’s position. As one observer notes, Vladimir Putin has exhibited “reasoned acquiescence,” that is, his “readiness to accept powerful adverse developments.”<sup>95</sup> As another analyst has put it, “Putin rarely wastes his breath or his time on the unrealizable.”<sup>96</sup> Given the seemingly inevitable U.S. military presence in the region, Putin understood that issuing protests would only marginalize Russia while making it painfully clear that Moscow had lost Central Asia.<sup>97</sup> The other option for Putin, to openly endorse the American military presence in Central Asia, would at least preserve Russia’s image as the region’s manager. If Putin played a role in helping the Americans, wrote one Russian analyst, “all subsequent decisions made by the Central Asian countries will be (or appear to be) [...] merely a consequence of Moscow’s decision.”<sup>98</sup> In this case, cooperation between the states of Central Asia and the United States could be perceived as being dependent on

---

<sup>93</sup> Zatulin Konstantin, “Vladimir Rushailo Tries to Forge a United Front,” September 19, 2001, The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Volume 53, No. 38, October 17, 2001; page 5.

<sup>94</sup> Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, RFE/RL Newline, September 18, 2001, <http://www.rferl.org/newline/2001/09/1-RUS/rus-180901.asp#archive> viewed February 18, 2007.

<sup>95</sup> Alex Pravda, “Putin’s Foreign Policy after 11 September: Radical or Revolutionary?” Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century, Ed. Gabriel Gorodetsky, (London and Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003) page 46.

<sup>96</sup> Bobo Lo, “The Securitization of Russian Foreign Policy under Putin,” Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century, Ed. Gabriel Gorodetsky, (London and Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003) page 17.

<sup>97</sup> Lena Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004) pages 83-86.

<sup>98</sup> Alan Kasayev, “Day of the Great Divide,” The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Volume 53, No. 38, October 17, 2001; page 5.

Russian approval. Thus, Putin sought to recast a U.S.-Central Asian partnership as being just a small part of a larger U.S.-Russian partnership.<sup>99</sup>

In attempting to display an element of control over the situation, President Putin placed explicit conditions on his ultimate endorsement. Before making any public announcement of support, Putin told President Bush:

“I am prepared to tell the heads of governments of the Central Asian states that we have good relations with that we have no objection to a U.S. role in Central Asia *as long as it has the object of fighting the war on terror and is temporary and is not permanent*. If it is that, then we will have no objection and that is what I will tell people.”<sup>100</sup>

In a public announcement only days later, portraying Russia as having the final say in the region, Putin gave not only Russia’s consent, but took the liberty of speaking on behalf of his Central Asian counterparts as well: “We have coordinated this position with our allies in Central Asia. They share this position and do not rule out the possibility of allowing the use of their airfields.”<sup>101</sup>

Ultimately, an endorsement from the Kremlin was of great help to the United States. As Alex Pravda points out, Russia’s “active help” was crucial in securing U.S. access to an air base in Tajikistan, a close Russian ally.<sup>102</sup> Meanwhile, says Pravda, Russia’s “facilitating acquiescence” eased the way for U.S. access to bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.<sup>103</sup> Even Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov, who was most likely to act without Russian approval, could accept a deal with greater ease “knowing that

---

<sup>99</sup> Lena Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004) pages 84-88.

<sup>100</sup> Quoted by Bob Woodward, Bush at War, (Simon & Schuster, 2002) page 118, emphasis added.

<sup>101</sup> Vladimir Putin, “Putin Outlines Steps to Help U.S. in Antiterrorist War,” Complete text of speech given on Russian television, September 25, 2001, The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Volume 53, No. 39, October 24, 2001.

<sup>102</sup> Alex Pravda, “Putin’s Foreign Policy after 11 September: Radical or Revolutionary?” Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century, Ed. Gabriel Gorodetsky, (London and Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003) page 44.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*

Moscow could live with the outcome.”<sup>104</sup> Indeed, Uzbekistan’s surprisingly stubborn reluctance to allow American military operations on its soil surprised Washington and had almost derailed the entire U.S. war plan.<sup>105</sup> It was only after Putin’s endorsement that Karimov conceded. The U.S.-led campaign, which had hinged on access to airbases in Uzbekistan, commenced only hours after the basing agreement was signed.

Souring relations between the United States and Russia over policy in Central Asia, however, have not been limited to the mere fact of an American military presence. It has been the overall strategies adopted by the U.S. and Russia, in dictating the terms of America’s presence in Central Asia, that reveal a U.S.-Russian dynamic that is one of adversaries, not of partners. As described above, Vladimir Putin crafted a policy in response to the impending U.S. presence that highlighted Russia’s continuing regional relevance through promoting cooperation with the United States. Leaders in Washington, however, adopted a strategy that was directly at odds with Russian objectives and deliberately undermined them.

The United States sought not only to establish military bases in Central Asia, but to make it clear to the states of Central Asia, to Russia, and to the world, that its doing so did not require the participation or approval of Moscow. Ensuring the “independence” of the Central Asian states, a long held American priority as discussed previously, required Washington to treat them as being detached from Moscow, and to do so without regard for Russian opinion. This inherently adversarial approach capitalized on Moscow’s help while it purposefully sought to minimize Russia’s importance. Although the primary goal of establishing military bases in Central Asia was the invasion of Afghanistan, it

---

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> Bob Woodward, Bush at War, (Simon & Schuster, 2002) pages 174, 181.

could not be lost on either the Americans or the Russians that such a presence would go a long way towards squelching Russia's presumed imperialistic tendencies, and make Central Asia "less tempting to Russia."<sup>106</sup> The subsequent deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations over Central Asia policy can in part be seen as the result of the tension between these two oppositional approaches: Moscow's attempt to maximize, and Washington's attempts to minimize, the Russian role in the region.

Prior to Putin's consent, and over Russian objections, the United States immediately opened bilateral negotiations with Uzbekistan. Condoleezza Rice expressed the strategic importance of establishing this relationship *without* Moscow's approval: to send Uzbekistan the message that Washington supports its independence.<sup>107</sup> Likewise, when Donald Rumsfeld voiced concerns over having to go through Russia to deal with Tajikistan, still a close ally of Moscow's, Rice offered assurances that this would not be necessary.<sup>108</sup> In a meeting with Russia's Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on September 20, 2001, George Bush indicated that the United States would not be seeking Russia's direct assistance or even its permission for the establishment of U.S. bases in Central Asia.<sup>109</sup> All that was needed was Russia's general cooperation; that is, its simple acquiescence to U.S. policy.

It was only after negotiations with Uzbekistan carried on longer than the U.S. had anticipated, and compromised America's war plans, that President Bush called the Kremlin and President Putin gave his strategic and conditional support.<sup>110</sup> Gladly

---

<sup>106</sup> Condoleezza Rice, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, Volume 79, Number 1, January/February 2000.

<sup>107</sup> Bob Woodward, Bush at War, (Simon & Schuster, 2002) page 116.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, page 178.

<sup>109</sup> Radio Free Liberty/Radio Liberty, RFE/RL Newslines, September 21, 2001, <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2001/09/1-RUS/rus-210901.asp#archive> viewed February 18, 2007.

<sup>110</sup> Bob Woodward, Bush at War, (Simon & Schuster, 2002) page 118.

accepting Russia's help in making Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan more compliant, Washington then proceeded to make it clear that it would disregard Russia's stated concerns.

Vladimir Putin's conditions that the American military presence be temporary, and have the exclusive objective of prosecuting the war in Afghanistan, while officially agreed to by President Bush, were immediately undermined by top U.S. officials. On October 5, 2001, only a day after Uzbekistan agreed to host the U.S. military, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced at a joint-press conference in Tashkent that "the interest of the United States in Uzbekistan, it should be well understood, precedes the events of September 11 [...] the interest of the United States is of a long-standing relationship with this country and not something that is focused on the immediate problem alone."<sup>111</sup> Echoing Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell said that he had "assured the President [of Uzbekistan] that our interest in Uzbekistan and in this region go far beyond the current crisis in Afghanistan. In the months ahead we look forward to deepening and widening our relationship with Uzbekistan," on security, and other issues.<sup>112</sup>

The United States and Uzbekistan moved quickly to do just that. In 2002, only weeks after President Bush declared that the United States had "put the terror training camps of Afghanistan out of business,"<sup>113</sup> the United States and Uzbekistan cosigned a *Declaration on Strategic Partnership*. The agreement was conceived of as a "mutual

---

<sup>111</sup> Donald Rumsfeld, Transcript of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's and President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov's Joint Press Conference, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, October 5, 2001, <http://www.usembassy.uz/home/index.aspx?&=&mid=217&overview=534> viewed February 13, 2007.

<sup>112</sup> Colin L. Powell, Joint Press Conference with President Islam Karimov, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, December 8, 2001, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/dec/6749.htm> viewed February 20, 2007.

<sup>113</sup> George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, Washington, D.C., January 29, 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> viewed February 20, 2007.

effort to develop a deeper, long-term relationship,” between the two parties<sup>114</sup> and, among other things, declared the intention to “intensify relations” in the military sphere by “establishing cooperation, *on a permanent basis*, between the law enforcement agencies and military services” of both countries.<sup>115</sup> Not once does the agreement mention Afghanistan. It does, however, state numerous times the importance of the “independence,” “territorial integrity,” and “sovereignty” of Uzbekistan and the rest of Central Asia—modern euphemisms for “containing Russian expansive tendencies.”<sup>116</sup> Indeed, U.S. official B. Lynn Pascoe testified before Congress in 2004 that the U.S. military presence in Uzbekistan “bolsters the sovereignty of and independence of” all the Central Asian states.<sup>117</sup> The actor supposedly threatening their independence is left unstated, but implied.

Bringing Zbigniew Brzezinski’s notion of geopolitical “pluralism” to life, Colin Powell told the House International Relations Committee, that now “America will have a continuing interest and presence in Central Asia, of a kind that we could not have dreamed of before.”<sup>118</sup> In a 2005 interview, Brzezinski voiced his approval, saying that because the United States had adopted a policy of “promoting geopolitical pluralism” in the FSU, by “supporting the independence of the post-Soviet states,” that finally, “we’re

---

<sup>114</sup> United States-Uzbekistan Signing Ceremony, Washington, D.C., March 12, 2002, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8735.htm> viewed February 1, 2007.

<sup>115</sup> Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework Between the United States of America and the Republic of Uzbekistan, Signed in Washington, D.C., March 12, 2002, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/2002/11711.htm> viewed February 1, 2007; emphasis added.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.; George Kennan (writing as “X”), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 25, 1946-1947.

<sup>117</sup> Lynn B. Pascoe, “Uzbekistan: The Key to Success in Central Asia?” Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Central Asia House International Relations Committee, June 15, 2004, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/33579.htm> viewed March 12, 2007.

<sup>118</sup> Colin L. Powell, Statement on President Bush’s Budget Request for FY2003, House International Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., February 6, 2002, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/7857.htm> Viewed October 5, 2006.

seeing with Mr. Putin the final gasp of the Soviet era.”<sup>119</sup> According to Brzezinski, and evident in U.S. policy, Russian foreign policy under Putin was a reminiscent of Stalinism and directed at “rehabilitating imperial nostalgia,” and creating “sustained and extensive hostility with all of its neighbors.”<sup>120</sup> The United States, having established a strong presence in Central Asia, could now assure that Russian expansion would not be realized. The Cold War, apparently, was still ongoing and a new containment policy was in place.

### *Losing Russia, Losing Central Asia*

When Vladimir Putin first announced his policy of cooperation with the U.S.-led anti-terror coalition, he noted that “the extent and nature of this cooperation will be directly dependent on the overall level and quality of our relations with these countries” and on a “mutual understanding” of objectives.<sup>121</sup> The longevity of this policy, according to one analyst, “hinges on how far Washington meets the [Russian] expectations of reciprocity.”<sup>122</sup> But aside from crafting a policy that deliberately undermined Russia’s regional role, the United States remained unwilling to offer any concessions, making it clear to Moscow that the new “partnership” would be relevant only to the degree that it suited America’s needs and geopolitical objectives, defined unilaterally. While its new strategic partnership with Russia was ongoing, the United States unilaterally withdrew

---

<sup>119</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, Interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “U.S./Russia: Zbigniew Brzezinski Assesses U.S.-Russia Relations,” May 11, 2005, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/05/b62307e1-832c-4fbc-ab91-ba8fa7a0eb24.html> viewed January 2, 2007.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Vladimir Putin, “Putin Outlines Steps to Help U.S. in Antiterrorist War,” Complete text of speech given on Russian television, September 25, 2001, *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, Volume 53, No. 39, October 24, 2001.

<sup>122</sup> Alex Pravda, “Putin’s Foreign Policy after 11 September: Radical or Revolutionary?” *Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*, Ed. Gabriel Gorodetsky, (London and Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003) page 39-40.

from the ABM treaty, aggressively pursued missile defense, and continued the enlargement of NATO.<sup>123</sup> Meanwhile, it failed to fulfill its promise to rescind the Jackson-Vanik amendment, a relic of the Soviet era which limited American investment in Russia. Moreover, the U.S. continued to block Russian admission to the World Trade Organization.<sup>124</sup> Putin's chief of staff reportedly complained to British journalists that this behavior was "a political signal that we are not good partners. We are glad-handing and there are not real tangible steps being taken towards us."<sup>125</sup> A Russian journalist commented that, "[o]ur country has taken several important steps to accommodate the U.S. without receiving a commensurate response."<sup>126</sup>

Needless to say, U.S. policy has strained the Kremlin's willingness to cooperate. Stewing resentment over America's continued disregard for Russian interests, and its continuing military presence in Central Asia, has forced Moscow to treat the situation for what it is: a confrontation. Indeed, for many observers in Russia, U.S. foreign policy after 9/11 had come to be seen as a "Western encirclement strategy," designed to "intimidate Russia."<sup>127</sup> By 2005 Russian discontent over America's Central Asian policy bubbled to the surface. Sergei Ivanov, Russia's Defense Minister asked the United States "to make up its mind: how many years will the war in Afghanistan go on: 20, 30, or 250

---

<sup>123</sup> Tellingly, it was at the first post 9/11 meeting of Bush and Putin, largely dedicated to a new partnership, that ABM issue was raised. Moreover, the very same post 9/11 rationale that was used to bolster the U.S.-Russian partnership was used minimize the importance of the ABM treaty. President Bush said that "The events of September the 11<sup>th</sup> make it clearer than ever that a Cold War ABM treaty that prevents us from defending our people is outdated, and I believe dangerous." Vladimir Putin responded that Russia considered the ABM treaty to be "an important element of stability in the world."

<sup>124</sup> Only, in November 2006, did the United States finally agree to the terms that would facilitate Russia's admission to the WTO.

<sup>125</sup> Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin's Russia and the End of Revolution, (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: A Lisa Drew Book/Scribner, 2005) pages 219-224.

<sup>126</sup> Lidia Andrusenko, "Political Scientists Give Putin Instructions," October 26, 2001, The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Volume 53, No. 43, November 21, 2001; page 4.

<sup>127</sup> Andrew Tully, "U.S.: What Is Strategy For Bases in Former Soviet Bloc?" <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/12/7141A858-DD57-4691-9F77-06B3C78D17D6.html> viewed February 26, 2007.

years?”<sup>128</sup> In July 2005, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), to which Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and China are all members, called for the end to America’s military presence in Central Asia:

“Considering the completion of the active military stage of antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization consider it necessary, that respective members of the antiterrorist coalition set a final timeline for their temporary use of the above-mentioned objects of infrastructure and stay of their military contingents on the territories of the SCO member states.”<sup>129</sup>

Yevgeny Primakov regarded the SCO statement as a “big step forward” for the countries in the region.<sup>130</sup> But, U.S. politicians and commentators saw things differently and tended to ignore the fact that Putin had ever put conditions on his support or that the United States had brazenly violated them. In a report titled *Russia’s Wrong Direction*, coauthors Stephen Sestanovich, John Edwards, and Jack Kemp write, “For the first time since 2001, Moscow prepared to throw up obstacles to Western policy, not because it now disagreed with the goal of fighting terrorism but because it subordinated this goal to a different geopolitical concern,” which was “to reverse the growing American presence in the region.”<sup>131</sup> Remarkably, this describes the mirror image of U.S. policy. The only significant difference is that Russia maintains indelible cultural and geographical connections to the region while the United States does not. Another author decried the

---

<sup>128</sup> Quoted by Vladimir Socor, “Tashkent Asks U.S. to Close Air Base,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Volume 2, Number 150, [http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article\\_id=2370091](http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2370091) viewed February 24, 2007.

<sup>129</sup> Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Astana, July 5, 2005. <http://www.sectsc.org/html/00500.html> viewed February 24, 2007.

<sup>130</sup> Primakov quoted in “Primakov Welcomes SCO Statement” *Interfax*. July 7, 2005.

<sup>131</sup> Stephen Sestanovich, John Edwards, and Jack Kemp, *Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do*, Council on Foreign Relations, Independent Task Force Report No. 57, 2006; page 26.

“Russian-led campaign to evict United States bases from Central Asia” as a “new political objective.”<sup>132</sup>

These analysts have it backwards though: the geopolitical concern of having U.S. bases in the region was always an issue for the Russians. Their cooperation with the United States was pursued only with the understanding that it was an opportunity for both parties to pursue their national interests. America’s failure to include Russia in this venture—even symbolically—while instead, taking efforts to undermine Russia’s traditional role, has led Russia to reprioritize its national interests and should have been expected to have a different outcome.

American perceptions of Russia’s new regional assertiveness, in addition to ignoring the possibility that this is a reaction to U.S. behavior, seem to take for granted that a new regional status quo exists. Ted Galen Carpenter, an analyst at the Cato Institute, notes that America’s bases in Central Asia send a message to Russia that “this is now a significant U.S. sphere of influence.”<sup>133</sup> Thus, paradoxically, the SCO, which consists only of the states of Central Asia, and their immediate neighbors Russia and China, has been characterized by U.S. officials as a tool of foreign influence. Richard Boucher, for example, has said that rather than “strengthen the independence and the sovereignty” of Central Asian states, the SCO, and other regional organizations to which Russia belonged, could be vehicles for “outside powers trying to exercise some control

---

<sup>132</sup> Vladimir Socor, “The Unfolding of the U.S.-Uzbekistan Crisis,” *Anatomy of a Crisis: U.S.-Uzbekistan Relations, 2001-2005*, Silk Road Paper, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, February 2006; pages 44-45.

<sup>133</sup> Quoted by Andrew Tully, “U.S.: What Is Strategy For Bases in Former Soviet Bloc?” <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/12/7141A858-DD57-4691-9F77-06B3C78D17D6.html> viewed February 26, 2007.

over what goes on in the region.”<sup>134</sup> Conversely, it is implied, in a staggering display of geographic re-conceptualization, that the United States is a natural and organic part of the region, not an “outside power” like Russia. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Meyers, minimized the July 5<sup>th</sup> SCO announcement, portraying it as an effort of Russia and China to “bully some smaller countries.”<sup>135</sup> That the four smaller countries had willfully joined the SCO, itself an act of sovereign independence, was lost on U.S. policy makers and commentators.

With even the façade of a partnership gone, the United States and Russia have entered into an all out zero-sum competition for power and influence in Central Asia. As recent developments make clear, America’s influence in the region is significantly weaker when it doesn’t have Moscow’s cooperation. When, after the Andijan Massacre of 2005, the United States called for an international investigation and then supported a UN airlift of refugees out of the region, Tashkent demanded that the United States cease activities at its military base and leave Uzbekistan. Because Russia fully backed Uzbekistan throughout the crisis it was later rewarded with access to ten Uzbek airfields.<sup>136</sup> Relations between the two countries have grown increasingly warmer since. In 2005 Russia and Uzbekistan conducted their first ever joint military exercises and, in December 2006, Uzbekistan rejoined the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led regional security organization from which it had withdrawn in 1998. These examples, among other things, are evidence that Uzbek-Russian relations

---

<sup>134</sup> Richard A. Boucher, Briefing of the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission), Federal News Service, September 26, 2006.

<sup>135</sup> Ann Scott Tyson, “Russia and China Bullying Central Asia, U.S. Says,” The Washington Post, July 15, 2005, page A.19.

<sup>136</sup> Viktoria Panfilova, and Vladimir Mukhin, “I’m Switching from Washington to Moscow,” June 30, 2005, The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Volume 57, No. 26, July 27, 2005.

have reached an all time high, which means in zero-sum politics, that Uzbek-U.S. relations are at an all time low.

While the facts of this realignment are clear enough, the motivations of the actors involved are perceived through a familiar framework. Rather than interpret Uzbekistan's new alliance with Russia as an independent decision made by a sovereign state, it is viewed as being the result of Russia's aggressive regional posture. When in late 2006 Uzbekistan awarded the Russians access to an additional Uzbek airfield, Stephen Blank wrote that it was another "important step forward in the Russian effort to lock up Uzbekistan as a loyal client state."<sup>137</sup> Western analyst Vladimir Socor describes Uzbekistan as having become "isolated from the West and once again dependent on Russia for its security assistance and diplomatic support."<sup>138</sup> Again, the independence of Uzbekistan is assured only when it is dependent on the United States, not Russia, for its security assistance and diplomatic support. Never mind that Uzbekistan's realignment is itself an act of independence, and that Karimov rejoiced shortly after rejoining the CSTO, "May [the United States] not teach us, force us, and tell us what to do."<sup>139</sup>

Herein lays perhaps the greatest irony in America's Central Asia policy. U.S. objectives of "independence" for the Central Asian states, in the sense that it means their being pried away from Russia and integrated into the West, has resulted in a form of actual independence. Fierce competition between the U.S. and Russia—and also China for that matter—have for the first time, given the Central Asian states distinctly different

---

<sup>137</sup> Stephen Blank, "An Uzbek Air Base: Russia's Newest Achievement in Central Asia," January 11, 2007, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav011107a.shtml> viewed January 23, 2007.

<sup>138</sup> Vladimir Socor, "The Unfolding of the U.S.-Uzbekistan Crisis," *Anatomy of a Crisis: U.S.-Uzbekistan Relations, 2001-2005*, Silk Road Paper, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, February 2006; page 46.

<sup>139</sup> Islam Karimov, "Uzbek President Addresses Nation on Constitution Day," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Newline, Vol. 10, No. 227, Part I, 11 December 2006.

foreign policy options, not mandatory alignment to a single power. This is hardly what the United States had intended. Surely, it was assumed, that in a zero-sum competition, the United States would win and Russia would lose. Instead, the Central Asian states find that they have new sources of power in leveraging the threat of alignment with one power for concessions from another.

After losing its base in Uzbekistan, the United States shifted much of its attention and resources to its remaining base in Kyrgyzstan. Recognizing that it now had leverage over the United States, and could align itself with either Russia and/or China, Kyrgyzstan renegotiated its basing agreement on more favorable terms. Additionally, the Kyrgyz government has become less shy about challenging U.S. authority in the region.

Recently, the Kyrgyz government has blamed the U.S. for a plane crash at the Manas Air Base and demanded reparations. In another example, the government has demanded jurisdiction and an independent investigation over a case of a Kyrgyz civilian being shot by a U.S. soldier. Kyrgyz State Secretary, Adakhan Madumarov, recently complained that the U.S. government was “pushing the country towards democracy,” but that Kyrgyzstan was “not getting richer or better-fed from this democracy.”<sup>140</sup> Ironically, it is the United States that has been the greatest impetus behind improving relations between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, traditionally one of the least Russian-centric states in all of Central Asia. This paradox has been noted by the scholar Martha Brill Olcott who has observed that “the increased U.S. security presence in Central Asia” has “worked to Russia’s advantage.”<sup>141</sup>

---

<sup>140</sup> Adakhan Madumarov, “Kyrgyz State Secretary Criticizes ‘U.S.’ Democracy,” RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 10, No. 225, Part I, 7 December 2006.

<sup>141</sup> Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005) page 185.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan, the object of a once-proposed U.S.-Russian partnership continues to devolve to the state it was in prior to September 11, facing the same fate as the partnership itself.

### **III – Competing for Energy Resources in Central Asia**

As has been described here, America's attempt to gain a strong foothold in Central Asia has been driven, in part, by the perceived need to limit Russia's presence and influence. Establishing U.S. military bases in Central Asia and seeking to develop deep and permanent bilateral relations with those states, independent of and despite Russian interests, have been directed towards achieving this goal. But, if the primary objective of U.S. policy is thwarting Russian imperialism then it has come three hundred years too late. Indeed, Russia's political, cultural, and economic dominance of Central Asia predates the founding of United States itself and continues today. The Central Asian states still have sizeable Russian populations and the Russian language remains the region's uncontested *lingua franca*. History has left Central Asian and Russian culture inextricably intertwined and their political and economic systems remarkably congruent. The elites of the five former Soviet states, including the current Presidents of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, are former Communists who were appointed to positions of power by Moscow during the Soviet era. In many cases Central Asian governments differ from Russia in that they are further from, not closer to, the type of Western liberalism idealized by U.S. policy makers. Yet, despite this inescapable reality, the United States has designated the region as being of crucial strategic importance, worthy of protection from Russian revanchism and within the American sphere of influence. This raises an

important question: Why is the United States suddenly concerned that Russia should dominate the region?

The answer to this question points in an obvious direction. The purpose of building substantial American influence in the region, at Russia's expense, is not an end in itself, but the means to achieving a larger objective: securing control of the energy resources in the Caspian Sea basin.

In May, 2001, the United States National Energy Policy (NEP) identified the Caspian Sea region as "a rapidly growing new area of supply" that would "lessen the impact of a supply disruption on the U.S." economy.<sup>142</sup> As the U.S. Department of Energy points out, the Caspian Sea basin is "a central focal point for untapped oil and natural gas resources."<sup>143</sup> Additionally, Ariel Cohen notes that "the Caspian region is a significant alternative source of fossil fuels" and could satisfy American objectives of diversifying its energy sources.<sup>144</sup> It is estimated, that by 2010 Caspian Sea oil production will reach nearly 4 million barrels a day (mb/d), the vast majority of which will be produced and controlled by the Central Asian state of Kazakhstan.<sup>145</sup>

It was not the mere discovery of these resources that caused U.S. policy makers to recognize the strategic importance of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. In fact, they are among the oldest known energy reserves on the planet.<sup>146</sup> What changed, is that after

---

<sup>142</sup> National Energy Policy Development Group, *The National Energy Policy of the United States Government*, May 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf> viewed March 14, 2007; page 133.

<sup>143</sup> Energy Information Administration, "Country Analysis Brief: Caspian Sea," <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/Full.html> viewed March 14, 2007.

<sup>144</sup> Ariel Cohen, "U.S. Interests and Central Asia Energy Security," *Backgrounder*, No. 1984, November 15, 2006.

<sup>145</sup> Energy Information Administration, "Country Analysis Brief: Caspian Sea," <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/Full.html> viewed March 14, 2007.

<sup>146</sup> Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power*, (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: The Free Press, 1991) pages 56-61.

1991 the Caspian was no longer under the exclusive control of Moscow and Tehran. Suddenly, three newly independent states, all desperate for foreign investment, bordered the Sea. This offered the U.S. an opportunity exert its influence, make inroads, and become a major force in the region.

As in recent efforts to fight terrorism, cooperation with Russia on energy issues has been talked about but never implemented. Rather, zero-sum competition for these resources has prevailed. This is because U.S. strategy in the region is dictated not only by the desire to control the production and export of these strategic resources, but also, to prevent Russia from doing so. As one American commentator warned, the “prize” of Caspian energy, valued in the trillions of dollars, could “give Russia both wealth and strategic opportunity” that would bring about “nightmare scenarios” for the United States.<sup>147</sup> Echoing this sentiment, then-Energy Secretary Bill Richardson pointed out that securing Caspian Sea energy resources was not just about “America’s energy security,” but also about “preventing strategic inroads by those who don’t share our values.”<sup>148</sup> Richardson argued that to ensure an American advantage, the newly independent littoral states should be “reliant on western commercial and political interests rather than going the other way.”<sup>149</sup> In other words, they should be “independent” from Russia.

While the collapse of the Soviet Union offered the United States a new opportunity in the Caspian region, the inverse was true for Russia. The deterioration of the status quo—which is the direct goal of U.S. policy—means the weakening of Russia’s strategic position. Where once Russia had unquestioned control, today it

---

<sup>147</sup> Mortimer B. Zuckerman, “The Big Game Gets Bigger,” *U.S. News & World Report*, May 10, 1999. Volume 126, Issue 18.

<sup>148</sup> Richardson, quoted by George Manbiot, “A Discreet Deal In the Pipeline,” *The Guardian*, February 15, 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,438134,00.html> viewed March 16, 2007.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*

competes with other former Soviet republics, now backed with the political, diplomatic, and even military support of the United States, in a quest for Caspian Sea riches. Not surprisingly, Russia has fought to preserve its advantage through the ownership and control not only of the Sea's resources but also its viable export pipeline routes. This places U.S. policy directly at odds with Russian objectives. As Russia's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, V.I. Kaliujny, said in 2003, the ubiquitous presence of the United States in Caspian Sea affairs "could not but affect Russian interests," including its national security.<sup>150</sup> Rather than acquiesce to American power, said Kaliujny, Russia must become more assertive in the region: "the scale of Russian interests in that region requires Russia's multifaceted and growing presence there. Those interests should be promoted more actively and vigorously, while any attempts infringing upon them should be rebuffed."<sup>151</sup> Consequently, on every issue that concerns the development of Caspian Sea energy resources, from ownership, to exploration and production, to export infrastructure, the United States and Russia have taken oppositional approaches.

### *Ownership and Control of Caspian Sea Oil*

In 1994, an \$8 billion dollar contract between British Petroleum and Azerbaijan marked the first time that a private international oil company would have access to the Caspian Sea, but also, triggered a crisis in international law. Because the Sea had theretofore been bordered only by Iran and the Soviet Union, it remained unclear as to how the Sea and its resources were to be divided. Russia immediately denounced the contract, claiming that previously existing treaties between the Soviet Union and Iran did

---

<sup>150</sup> V.I. Kaliujny, Statement at the Round Table Meeting on Caspian Oil and Gas Scenarios, Florence, April 14, 2003, <http://www.iea.org/Textbase/work/2003/caspian/kalyuzhny.pdf> viewed March 17, 2007.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid.

not provide for the exploitation of the Sea's resources based on the unilateral actions of a single littoral state. The Caspian Sea, according to Russia, was "subject to joint utilization" and "any questions relating to activities, including the exploitation of its resources must be decided jointly by all the countries bordering its coast."<sup>152</sup> In making unilateral deals with private oil companies, the newly independent states were "seeking to obtain unilateral advantages, to the detriment of the rights and interests of other Caspian Sea states" and were displaying "disregard for the legal nature of the Caspian Sea and for their obligations under international agreements."<sup>153</sup>

The newly independent states, however, were eager for foreign investment and claimed differently. Azerbaijan argued that the "traditional activities" of the littoral states dictated the existence of "national sectors" in which each state could do as it pleased.<sup>154</sup> Likewise, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan argued that until a new multilateral agreement could be reached, the Sea should be treated as being territorially delimited.<sup>155</sup> Accordingly, they recognized "the right of each coastal State to carry out work to develop the mineral resources of the Caspian seabed."<sup>156</sup>

The United States, the only non-riparian party to weigh in on the dispute, opposed Russia and supported the legal position of the newly independent states. The geopolitical considerations for doing so could not be clearer: the positions of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan would, for the first time, give the United States access to the Caspian Sea, while Russia's position would continue to keep it out. Glen Rase, the

---

<sup>152</sup> Letter dated 5 October 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. UN Document A/49/475.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

<sup>154</sup> Letter dated 11 December 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations address to the Secretary-General. UN Document A/53/741.

<sup>155</sup> Letter dated 14 March 1997 from the Permanent Representatives of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. UN Document A/52/93.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

U.S. State Department's Director of International Energy Policy at the time, argued that there was no basis in international law to develop the Caspian Sea the way that "the Russians prefer to have happen."<sup>157</sup> Rather, Rase argued, "the arrangement that would seem most likely to produce desirable results for all parties would be to have lines of divisions for economic purposes on the sea bed to create exclusive economic zones. That strikes us as a perfectly reasonable way to go forward and that certainly seems to be what the Kazakhs, Azeris and Turkmens desire."<sup>158</sup> When Rase talks about producing desirable results for "all parties" he clearly means all parties except Russia and Iran.

Although there is no basis in international law for a non-littoral state like the U.S. to implement a legal framework for Caspian Sea delimitation, the laws of power politics have made American influence decisive. With the full support of the United States government behind Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Russia was too weak to remain in opposition. Iurii Merzliakov, Russia's former Head of the Working Group on the Caspian Sea, finally had to acknowledge that the Russian legal position "did not prevent American oil companies from coming to the Caspian" and proved Russia's position, while legally sound, to be "hopeless."<sup>159</sup> As one legal analyst has observed, Russia changed its position "not because their opponents' legal arguments proved to be compelling but, rather, because forces of domestic and international politics left them with no other viable options."<sup>160</sup> The post-Soviet legal basis for the delimitation of the Caspian Sea was ultimately determined "not in the courtroom but in the boardroom of

---

<sup>157</sup> Glen Rase, Interview with Terry Manzi, *Caspian Crossroads Magazine*, Number 1, Winter 1995, <http://ourworld.compuserve.com/HOME/PAGES/USAZERB/11.htm> viewed March 16, 2007.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>159</sup> Iurii Merzliakov, "Legal Status of the Caspian," *International Affairs: A Russian Journal*, March 1999, p. 2, [http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/iarj/iarj\\_99mei01.html](http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/iarj/iarj_99mei01.html) viewed March 20, 2007.

<sup>160</sup> Kamyar Mehdoyoun, "Ownership of Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian Sea," *The American Journal of International Law*, January 2000; 94; page 189.

domestic and international politics.”<sup>161</sup> The Caspian Sea would henceforth be regarded as having exclusive national sectors, with Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan signing a series of treaties between 1998 and 2002 codifying the precise delimitation of the North Caspian seabed.

This breakthrough has benefited Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and the United States, but not Russia. In July 2000, a consortium comprised mostly of Western firms, Agip KCO, discovered the Kashagan oil field in the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea, which is said to be “the most important oil find of the last thirty years worldwide.”<sup>162</sup> The Kashagan is the fifth largest oil field in the world today, and the single largest field outside of the Middle East.<sup>163</sup> Although it is firmly within Russia’s former realm of control, development of the Kashagan will exclude Moscow entirely. Instead, its resources are to be controlled, produced, and managed by private Western firms and the Kazakh government.

In the summer of 2006, Steven Mann testified before Congress that “since the independence of the new Caspian states 15 years ago, the United States has been in the forefront of oil and gas development in the region, and our efforts are paying off.”<sup>164</sup> Indeed, of the total 4 mb/d expected to be produced in the Caspian by 2010, 2.5 mb/d will be produced by Kazakhstan, with the help of U.S. capital.<sup>165</sup> Russia, meanwhile, will not

---

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

<sup>162</sup> Agip KCO, “Kashagan: Giant Field Beneath the North Caspian,” [http://www.agipkco.com/en/what\\_we\\_doing/what\\_we\\_doing\\_en.htm](http://www.agipkco.com/en/what_we_doing/what_we_doing_en.htm) viewed November 24, 2006.

<sup>163</sup> Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Briefs: Kazakhstan,” <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Kazakhstan/pdf.pdf> viewed November 24, 2006.

<sup>164</sup> Steven R. Mann, “Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia,” Testimony before the United States House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, July 25, 2006.

<sup>165</sup> Bernard A. Gelb, “Caspian Oil and Gas: Production and Prospects,” CRS Report for Congress, September 8, 2006.

exceed Caspian production levels of 200,000 barrels per day (b/d) during the same period.<sup>166</sup>

### *Pipeline Politics*

Control is not linked exclusively to ownership of resources but also to ownership of transportation infrastructure. Nowhere is this truer than the land-locked Caspian Sea where oil and gas must pass through one or more states in order to reach world markets. This has been to Russia's advantage. One of the Soviet Union's most visible legacies is the region's network of pipelines, which pass largely through Russian territory and are still owned and controlled by Moscow. Conversely, this creates serious challenges for a geographically distant country like the United States.

Accordingly, the United States has implemented a policy aimed at reducing Russian control and influence over the region's energy exports. This policy is often described as "diversification" or "de-monopolization" of pipelines, but it may as well be called "de-Russification." U.S. policy on this issue is constructed on almost perfect zero-sum calculations and is inherently at odds with Russian interests. In discussing the viability of U.S.-supported, non-Russian energy pipeline options, Zeyno Baran testified before Congress that these routes would not come to fruition "unless the U.S. is seriously committed to changing the energy dynamics in Eurasia, which ultimately means confrontation with Russia's regional energy strategy."<sup>167</sup> Baran advised more rigorous

---

<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> Zeyno Baran, "Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia," Testimony before the United States House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, July 25, 2006.

American involvement, saying that “we need to recognize [...] that there is no win-win strategy with Russia in Central Asia regarding energy.”<sup>168</sup>

The region’s first major post-Soviet pipeline, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), was completed in 2001 and included U.S., Russian, and Kazakh firms. President Bush hailed its completion as an example that “the United States, Russia, and Kazakhstan are cooperating to build prosperity and stability in this part of the world.”<sup>169</sup> However, the CPC did not go far enough in meeting export capacity demands or fulfilling U.S. objectives. As the single largest single shareholder in the project, Russia wields a veto over decisions about further pipeline investment. It has used this power to block CPC expansion because it gains higher profits when Kazakhstan’s oil is shipped through other routes, also controlled by Russia.<sup>170</sup> In addition, the CPC runs exclusively through Russian territory. The vast majority of Kazakhstan’s total oil exports still flow through Russia and of that amount, 63% utilize the CPC.<sup>171</sup> Overall, then, the CPC fails to give the United States any significant leverage in determining the fate of Caspian Sea oil exports and, thus, other options have been vigorously supported by Washington: for example, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.

Unlike the CPC, the BTC pipeline is entirely free of Russian influence. It was purposefully designed to bypass Russian territory and it excludes all Russian investment. Richard Boucher celebrated the opening of the BTC in 2006 as “a major success for the

---

<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

<sup>169</sup> George W. Bush, “President’s Statement on Caspian Pipeline Consortium,” November 28, 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011128-11.html> viewed March 21, 2007.

<sup>170</sup> Rachel Graham, “Russia rejects CPC pipeline expansion plan,” *Platt’s Oilgram News*, Volume 84, Issue 219, page 6, November 14, 2006; “Moscow piles pressure on CPC over transit fees,” *Energy Compass*, (London: October 26, 2006).

<sup>171</sup> Irina Denisova, “Kazakh Pipeline Problems,” *Caspian Investor* WorldTrade Executive, Inc. January 2006, Volume 9, Issue 1.

U.S. goal of enhancing and diversifying global energy supplies.”<sup>172</sup> He also described it as the “centerpiece” of America’s “long supported” plans to develop an “East-West Energy Corridor,” that is, a route that avoids Russia to the North and Iran to the South.<sup>173</sup> Euphemistically, he praised the BTC’s 1,000 mile long route, which winds its way through rigorous mountain terrain and politically unstable regions—so as to avoid both Russian and Iranian territory—as a “magnificent achievement of engineering.”<sup>174</sup> The BTC’s now famed standing as a wonder of modern technology, not to mention its enormous cost (approximately \$4 billion), are owed entirely to U.S. political objectives, not to necessity. The cheapest, safest, and most accessible routes are seen as giving too much control to America’s geopolitical rivals.<sup>175</sup> What really matters, as one U.S. official noted, was that the BTC pipeline “has changed the strategic landscape of Eurasia in a very positive way.”<sup>176</sup> In other words, it strengthens the United States at Russia’s expense.

While the BTC pipeline succeeded in creating a new export option, favoring U.S. over Russian interests, it failed to connect to the Caspian Sea’s largest producing state, Kazakhstan. Recognizing this problem Steven Mann testified before Congress that in the U.S. “policy of anti-monopoly,” the BTC would comprise only the “first phase of the east-west energy corridor.”<sup>177</sup> He continued by saying “we must now press on with the

---

<sup>172</sup> Richard A. Boucher, “United States Welcomes Opening of Caspian Basin Pipeline,” Statement by Richard Boucher at the BTC opening in Baku, May 25, 2005.

<http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2005/May/25-468295.html> viewed March 21, 2007.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

<sup>175</sup> Andrew I. Killgore, “Ideology Trumps Economic Efficiency, as The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Opens,” *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, August 2005, page 32.

<sup>176</sup> Steven R. Mann, “Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia,” Testimony before the United States House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, July 25, 2006.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

second phase of supporting new energy routes out of Central Asia.”<sup>178</sup> This “second phase” has been in planning for some time. As early as 2001, long before the BTC pipeline was a reality, the U.S. National Energy Policy Development Group advised that the United States work to ensure “conditions that will allow oil companies operating in Kazakhstan the option of exporting their oil via the BTC pipeline.”<sup>179</sup> By 2005, still prior to the BTC pipeline’s completion, a report monitoring the implementation of NEP recommendations stated that this policy had already been implemented, noting ongoing negotiations between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.<sup>180</sup> In the summer of 2006, after the continued prodding of U.S. officials, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan signed a formal agreement to begin shipping 500,000 b/d of Kazakh crude via the BTC.<sup>181</sup> This comprises half of the pipeline’s entire initial capacity and constitutes a significant amount of oil that will be subtracted from the Russian pipeline system, causing a decrease not only in Moscow’s revenues, but also in its regional influence. This is not an unintended consequence of U.S. policy, but a major objective. To further bolster the importance of the BTC, and enhance its competitiveness relative the Russian-controlled CPC, the United States has also endorsed a trans-Caspian pipeline. But, thus far, Russia has successfully blocked plans for its development.<sup>182</sup>

---

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>179</sup> National Energy Policy Development Group, *The National Energy Policy of the United States Government*, May 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf> viewed March 14, 2007; page 139.

<sup>180</sup> National Energy Policy Status Report on Implementation of NEP Recommendations, U.S. Department of Energy, January, 2005. <http://www.pi.energy.gov/documents/NEPImplementationReport012505.pdf> Viewed March 14, 2007; page 31.

<sup>181</sup> Vince Crawley, “U.S. Asks Kazakhstan to Finish Talks on Caspian Oil Pipeline,” *U.S. Federal News Service*, March 14, 2006, <http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2006/Mar/14-988859.html> viewed March 26, 2007; Nadia Rodova, “Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan leaders sign BTC pact,” *Platt’s Oilgram News*, June 19, 2006, Volume 84, Issue 116.

<sup>182</sup> “No Go: Transneft Slams New Caspian Routes,” *NEFTE Compass*, (London: June 22, 2005) page 1; “Azerbaijan: Russia Fails to Get Answers Over Oil Transport,” *NEFTE Compass*, (London: Feb. 28, 2006) page 1.

Despite these successes in U.S. policy, Russia still maintains a tremendous amount of control over the region's pipeline network and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Additionally, Russia has demonstrated its willingness to use this control to achieve political objectives, confirming U.S. decision makers' worst fears. Defending the use of energy as a political weapon, Sergei Lavrov said "Russian foreign policy today is such that for the first time in its history, Russia is beginning to protect its national interest by using its competitive advantages."<sup>183</sup> Although the United States has tried to mitigate this reality, by promoting non-Russian export options, it cannot change it altogether. Instead, the U.S. has protested Russia's new found political power and questioned its legitimacy. For example, in 2006 Dick Cheney declared that "[n]o legitimate interest is served when oil and gas become tools of intimidation or blackmail, either by supply manipulation or attempts to monopolize transportation."<sup>184</sup> The very next day, speaking at President Nazarbayev's side in Kazakhstan, and reaffirming "the strong ties between Kazakhstan and the United States," the Vice President reiterated this statement.<sup>185</sup>

But U.S. rhetoric has gone beyond mere complaints to include what cannot be considered as anything other than intimidation. Recently, top U.S. officials have suggested that the political manipulation of energy supplies, as has been exhibited by Russia, might constitute an act of war. U.S. Senator Richard Lugar, for example, argued in November 2006 that for NATO to maintain its relevance in the future "it must expand

---

<sup>183</sup> Quoted by Victor Yasmann, "Russia: Kremlin Sees Its Foreign-Policy Star On Rise," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 21, 2007, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/03/2e6ae5fc-18c5-4150-85a2-91dde1e4e823.html> viewed March 21, 2007.

<sup>184</sup> Dick Cheney, Remarks at the 2006 Vilnius Conference, Reval Hotel Lietuva, Vilnius, Lithuania. May 4, 2006, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060504-1.html> viewed February 26, 2007.

<sup>185</sup> Dick Cheney, "Vice President's Remarks in a Press Availability with President Nursultan Nazarbayev of the Republic of Kazakhstan," Astana, Kazakhstan, May 5, 2006, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/print/20060505-4.html> viewed October 3, 2006.

beyond the mission of military defense” and include issues of “energy scarcity and manipulation.”<sup>186</sup> Likening the deliberate cutoff of energy to a “blockade or other military demonstration,” Lugar proposed that NATO alter its charter so that “defending against such attacks become an Article Five commitment,” which means that the alliance treat “an attack on one member as an attack on all.”<sup>187</sup> NATO’s subsequent *Comprehensive Political Guidance* agreement, which “provides a framework and political direction for NATO’s continuing transformation,” identified the manipulation and disruption of energy resources as one of the “main risks or challenges for the Alliance” over the next decade.<sup>188</sup> Accordingly, NATO heads of state hinted at a potential re-conceptualization of Article 5 commitments noting that “the character of potential Article 5 challenges is continuing to evolve.”<sup>189</sup> It seems that NATO enlargement is now multidimensional, occurring not only through the addition of member states, but also through transformations in thinking and a broadening of purpose.

Never before has Russia been given such a direct answer to the question that it has been asking for the past fifteen years: “against whom is this expansion intended?”<sup>190</sup> The only continuity exhibited by NATO throughout its history is its exclusion of, and, opposition to Russia. This fact is not lost on Richard Lugar. When suggesting a modification of Article V, Lugar argued that NATO’s commitment to collective defense

---

<sup>186</sup> Richard G. Lugar, “Speech in Advance of NATO Summit,” November 22, 2006, <http://www.lugar.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=266087> viewed December 7, 2006.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.

<sup>188</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Comprehensive Political Guidance,” Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on November 29, 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b061129e.htm> viewed December 7, 2006.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid.

<sup>190</sup> Vladimir Putin, Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2007, [http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138\\_type82912type82914type82917type84779\\_118135.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118135.shtml) viewed February 12, 2007.

“was the bedrock of our Cold War alliance” against aggression “by a non-member state,” and must be maintained today to deter new threats.<sup>191</sup> Additionally, he called for newly modified REFORGER exercises. These exercises, a staple of the Cold War era, were preparatory drills to “thwart a Soviet attack.”<sup>192</sup> Today, says Lugar, they should be revived to deal with “geo-strategic blackmail” resulting from Russia’s pipeline monopoly.<sup>193</sup>

### *Losing Kazakhstan?*

In September 2006, during a White House visit by President Nazarbayev, President Bush said of Kazakhstan that “I have watched very carefully the development of this important country from one that was in the Soviet sphere to one that now is a free nation.”<sup>194</sup> This characterization is an interesting one given that President Nazarbayev has been in power for almost twenty years without once being confirmed through free and fair elections. But President Bush was not speaking literally. What he meant by this statement was that Kazakhstan had moved from the “Soviet sphere” to the American one. In a joint statement issued at the end of their meeting, Presidents Bush and Nazarbayev celebrated Kazakhstan’s decision to export via the BTC and agreed that continued partnership between the two countries would effectively “promote the participation of U.S. companies in exploring the [energy] reserves of Kazakhstan.”<sup>195</sup> Moreover, the two

---

<sup>191</sup> Richard G. Lugar, “Speech in Advance of NATO Summit,” November 22, 2006, <http://www.lugar.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=266087> viewed December 7, 2006.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid.

<sup>194</sup> George W. Bush, “President Bush Welcomes President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan to the White House” September 29, 2006, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/print/20060929-5.html> viewed October 3, 2006.

<sup>195</sup> Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Kazakhstan, September 29, 2006, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/print/20060929-1.html> viewed October 3, 2006.

Presidents pledged to “enhance efforts to expand global energy supplies” and to “seek new means to deliver those resources to the international market.”<sup>196</sup> Apparently, for a state to qualify as a “free nation” it need do little else than support U.S. political objectives.

Despite this evidence of a strong U.S.-Kazakh relationship, though, fissures have formed indicating a deterioration in relations. After meeting with top officials of the Kazakh government in 2006, The National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) reported that Kazakhstan had “tilted away from the United States,” because it had allowed a number of Russian firms access to “strategically important energy and metal extracting sectors.”<sup>197</sup> The findings note that “[t]he ability of the Russian government and Russian businesspeople to project influence in Kazakhstan reflects both economic and cultural reality.”<sup>198</sup>

Analyst Zeyno Baran warned Congress in 2006 that there were signs that Kazakhstan could potentially “become yet another ‘lost’ country like Uzbekistan.”<sup>199</sup> Baran’s policy prescription was that even more intense American involvement in the region is required.<sup>200</sup> But ironically, Kazakhstan’s recent assertiveness, and its ability to exert more independence—a trait which U.S. policy makers applaud with regards to Russia but find troubling when directed towards the United States—has been a result of the very policy that Baran endorses.

---

<sup>196</sup> Ibid.

<sup>197</sup> National Committee on American Foreign Policy, “Stability and Security in Central Asia: Engaging Kazakhstan,” August 2006. Michael Rywkin, Project Director.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

<sup>199</sup> Zeyno Baran, “Assessing Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia,” Testimony for the United States House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, July 25, 2006.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid.

Kazakhstan's oil and gas sector has matured to the point that it is increasingly less dependent on U.S. investment. With GDP increasing at approximately 10% annually, Kazakhstan may even become a net exporter of capital.<sup>201</sup> This has given Astana the freedom to rebuff U.S. political directives and pressures, and to do things its "own Kazakh way."<sup>202</sup> In November 2006, only weeks after his visit to Washington, President Nazarbayev complained:

"We have enough advisers now, from here and from there, from the West, from beyond the ocean [telling us] how to live, how to work [...] Kazakhstan is no longer a state that can be ordered about and told what to do. We know what we have to do. We shouldn't run after foreign recommendations with our pants down [...] Our chief interest should be the people and Kazakhstan, the rest is crap."<sup>203</sup>

Additionally, pipeline diversification, which has made Russia weaker, has inadvertently made Kazakhstan stronger. As Martha Brill Olcott observes, "[t]he improvements in prospects for the transport of Kazakh oil" have "emboldened the Kazakh government."<sup>204</sup> Over the past two years Kazakhstan has passed a number of laws indicating that it has taken a cue from Russia, not the United States, on how its energy resources should be managed and who should own them. Newly aggressive government policies seek to reinterpret and even rewrite concession contracts with Western oil companies.<sup>205</sup> For example, the Kazakh government has recently considered abrogating contractual commitments which were signed in the 1990s on the basis that

---

<sup>201</sup> The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Kazakhstan. October, 2006.

<sup>202</sup> Nazarbayev quoted in "Nazarbaev Outlines Kazakhstan Priorities," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 28, 2007. <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/02/1C4A7C31-90FE-49DA-B884-B55A92A6BD9E.html> viewed March 5, 2007.

<sup>203</sup> Quoted by Bruce Pannier, "Kazakhstan: President Tells West – We Don't Need Your Advice" November 15, 2006, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/11/FC8D6959-5ECA-4920-9AA0-630E18B2E352.html> viewed December 16, 2006.

<sup>204</sup> Martha Brill Olcott, *Central Asia's Second Chance*, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005) page 90.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid.

they now give private firms too much benefit and the government too little.<sup>206</sup> The special incentives that were once required to lure private oil firms are now viewed as being obsolete. As in Russia, laws that favor the interests of private investors over the state are perpetually subject to revision.

Lastly, officials in the Kazakh government remain suspicious about the emphasis placed on democratization in U.S. foreign policy. After meeting with top officials in the Kazakh government, NCAFP members were “surprised” to learn that “the U.S. insistence on democratic freedoms” was regarded as “a call for ‘regime change’ that represents an unwelcome intrusion into justly earned independence and sovereignty.”<sup>207</sup> From this perspective, it is Russia, not the United States that offered Kazakhstan the best chances at securing sovereignty and independence. Tellingly, Russian-Kazakh relations continue to improve as U.S. relations become increasingly cooler with both.

## **Conclusion**

America’s failure to cooperate with Russia in Central Asia has not been the result of a divergence in interests, miscommunication, or poor policy implementation. Rather, enduring Cold War perceptions of Russia have demanded the modification and continuation of Cold War policy; that is, Russia continues to be perceived as an adversary whose influence must be checked, not a partner with common interests. In a refashioning of Soviet-era containment policy, the United States seeks not only to contain Russia within its “sphere of influence” but to ensure that it never again develops one outside of

---

<sup>206</sup> Arthur Shakhnazaryan, “They Should Expect a Tax Audit,” *Gazeta.kz* January 26, 2007, Draft Translation from Russian.

<sup>207</sup> National Committee on American Foreign Policy, “Stability and Security in Central Asia: Engaging Kazakhstan,” August 2006. Michael Rywkin, Project Director.

its own borders. In Central Asia, the underbelly of the former Soviet Union, this means marginalizing Moscow's power and influence, and bringing these states firmly within Washington's guardianship. Opportunities for cooperation are, therefore, not merely neglected, but necessarily impossible.

Attenuating Russian influence in Central Asia does not merely help consolidate a Western-leaning, post-Soviet landscape, but also, enables the U.S. to achieve a crucial geo-strategic position in a new race for natural resources. American foreign policy in Central Asia has, thus far, given the United States a crucial role in the ownership, development, and control of the strategic energy resources of the Caspian Sea basin. This has been at Russia's expense.

But, Washington has found that replacing Moscow as the regional hegemon is an enormous challenge. The U.S. remains an outsider not only geographically, but culturally and ideologically, resulting in an almost inherent turbulence in its relations with Central Asian states. Moscow's mere disapproval makes managing bilateral relations with the Central Asian states even more difficult while it's increasingly aggressive posture in the region, a pushback against U.S. policy, has proven to be highly effectual and often decisive. History and geography demand Russia's continued relevance. America's attempts to bypass this integral player have only weakened its own regional standing.

At the dawn of the post-Cold War era, Richard Nixon advised that U.S. foreign policy in the former Soviet Union would best serve America's interests if it were carried out with acceptance and respect for Russian interests:

"We should be realistic about our limited leverage in Russia's backyard and should avoid creating the impression that the United States wants to proceed with a new encirclement of Russia. It would be contrary to our interests to give Moscow the impression that we

are prepared to help only as long as Russia remains on its knees. Russia is a great country that deserves to be treated with appropriate respect. U.S. leverage depends upon the perception in Moscow that America is a friendly nation that wishes it well and takes it seriously as a major power.”<sup>208</sup>

American interests may have been best served if the decision had been made to cooperate with Russia and take advantage of its deep regional ties and influence in Central Asia. But a win-win approach, too foreign to Cold War mentality, was never implemented. Instead, the U.S. has chosen a course that has not only resulted in deterioration in relations with Moscow, but has also contributed to a weakening in bilateral relations with the states of Central Asia. In the zero-sum game for regional power and influence, the United States is losing.

---

<sup>208</sup> Richard Nixon, Beyond Peace, (New York: Random House, 1994) page 63.

## Bibliography

- Abdullaev, Nabi. "Kremlin Warns of Strain in U.S. Ties." Moscow Times, August 8, 2006.
- Agip KCO. "Kashagan: Giant Field Beneath the North Caspian." [http://www.agipkco.com/en/what\\_we\\_doing/what\\_we\\_doing\\_en.htm](http://www.agipkco.com/en/what_we_doing/what_we_doing_en.htm) viewed November 24, 2006.
- Akbarzadeh, Shahram. Uzbekistan and the United States: Authoritarianism, Islamism & Washington's Security Agenda. London & New York: Zed Books, 2005.
- Andrusenko, Lidia. "Political Scientists Give Putin Instructions." October 26, 2001. The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press. Volume 53, No. 43, November 21, 2001.
- "Azerbaijan: Russia Fails to Get Answers Over Oil Transport." NEFTE Compass. London: Feb. 28, 2006.
- Baker, Peter and Glasser, Susan. Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin's Russia and the End of Revolution. New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: A Lisa Drew Book/Scribner, 2005.
- Baran, Zeyno. "Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia" Testimony before the United States House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, July 25, 2006.
- Blank, Stephen. "An Uzbek Air Base: Russia's Newest Achievement in Central Asia." January 11, 2007. <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav011107a.shtml> viewed January 23, 2007.
- Boucher, Richard A. Briefing of the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission). Federal News Service, September 26, 2006.
- , Interfax Interview, October 11, 2006. <http://www.interfax.com/17/201475/interview.aspx> viewed February 24, 2007.
- , "United States Welcomes Opening of Caspian Basin Pipeline." Statement by Richard Boucher at the BTC opening in Baku, May 25, 2005. <http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2005/May/25-468295.html> viewed March 21, 2007.
- Bremmer, Ian. "The Dawn of the Next Cold War" Newsweek. February 26, 2007.

- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "The Premature Partnership" Foreign Affairs. Volume 73, Number 2, March/April 1994.
- , "A Geostrategy for Eurasia" Foreign Affairs. Volume 76, Number 5, September/October 1997.
- , Interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, "U.S./Russia: Zbigniew Brzezinski Assesses U.S.-Russia Relations." May 11, 2005.  
<http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/05/b62307e1-832c-4fbc-ab91-ba8fa7a0eb24.html> viewed January 2, 2007.
- Burr, J. Millard and Collins, Robert O. Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Bush, George H.W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, September 11, 1990. <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1990/90091101.html> viewed March 5, 2007.
- Bush, George W. "A Distinctly American Internationalism" Speech given at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999.  
<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm> viewed February 9, 2007.
- , Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention, Philadelphia, August 3, 2000. <http://www.2000gop.com/convention/speech/speechbush.html> viewed February 9, 2007.
- , "President Bush Welcomes President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan to the White House" September 29, 2006.  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/print/20060929-5.html> viewed October 3, 2006.
- , State of the Union Address, Washington, D.C. January 29, 2002.  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> viewed February 20, 2007.
- , "President's Statement on Caspian Pipeline Consortium" November 28, 2001.  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011128-11.html> viewed March 21, 2007.
- Cheney, Dick. Remarks at the 2006 Vilnius Conference. Reval Hotel Lietuva, Vilnius, Lithuania. May 4, 2006.  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060504-1.html> viewed February 26, 2007.

- , "Vice President's Remarks in a Press Availability with President Nursultan Nazarbayev of the Republic of Kazakhstan." Astana, Kazakhstan, May 5, 2006. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/print/20060505-4.html> viewed October 3, 2006.
- Cohen, Ariel. "U.S. Interests and Central Asia Energy Security." Backgrounder, No. 1984, November 15, 2006.
- Cohen, Stephen F. "The New American Cold War" The Nation. July 6, 2006.
- Clinton, Bill. "A Conspectus for Russia's Entry Into the Global Economy." Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Annapolis, Maryland. April 1, 1993. The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches and Commentary. Eds. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Albina Shayevich, and Boris Zlotnikov. Armonk, London: M.E. Sharpe, 2000.
- Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: The Penguin Press, 2004.
- Crawley, Vince. "U.S. Asks Kazakhstan to Finish Talks on Caspian Oil Pipeline." U.S. Federal News Service, March 14, 2006. <http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2006/Mar/14-988859.html> viewed March 26, 2007.
- Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Astana, July 5, 2005. <http://www.sectsco.org/html/00500.html> viewed February 24, 2007.
- Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework Between the United States of America and the Republic of Uzbekistan. Signed in Washington, D.C., March 12, 2002. <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/2002/11711.htm> viewed February 1, 2007.
- Denisova, Irina. "Kazakh Pipeline Problems" Caspian Investor WorldTrade Executive, Inc. January 2006, Volume 9, Issue 1.
- The Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report: Kazakhstan. October, 2006.
- Energy Information Administration. "Country Analysis Brief: Caspian Sea" <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/Full.html> viewed March 14, 2007.
- Energy Information Administration. "Country Analysis Briefs: Kazakhstan" <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Kazakhstan/pdf.pdf> viewed November 24, 2006.

- Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Avon Books, Inc., 1992.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History New York: The Penguin Press, 2005.
- Gelb, Bernard A. “Caspian Oil and Gas: Production and Prospects” CRS Report for Congress, September 8, 2006.
- Glasser, Susan B. “Russia Rejects Joint Military Action With United States.” Washington Post, page A06, September 15, 2001.
- Goldgeier, James M. and McFaul, Michael. Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy toward Russia after the Cold War. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
- Graham, Rachel. “Russia rejects CPC pipeline expansion plan.” Platt’s Oilgram News. Volume 84, Issue 219, page 6, November 14, 2006.
- Grimmett, Richard F. “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998-2005.” Report for Congress, October 23, 2006.
- Ivanov, Sergei. “There will be no military operations on CIS territory” September 15, 2001. The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press. Volume 53, No. 37, October 10, 2001.
- Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Kazakhstan. September 29, 2006.  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/print/20060929-1.html>  
viewed October 3, 2006.
- Joint Statement on Counterterrorism by the President of the United States and the President of Russia. Shanghai, China, October 21, 2001.  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011022-11.html> viewed February 16, 2007.
- Jonson, Lena. Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004.
- Kaliujny, V.I. Statement at the Round Table Meeting on Caspian Oil and Gas Scenarios. Florence, April 14, 2003.  
<http://www.iea.org/Textbase/work/2003/caspian/kalyuzhny.pdf> viewed March 17, 2007.
- Karimov, Islam. “Uzbek President Addresses Nation on Constitution Day” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Newline, Vol. 10, No. 227, Part I, 11 December 2006.

- Kasayev, Alan. "Day of the Great Divide" The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press. Volume 53, No. 38, October 17, 2001.
- "Kashagan oil field can grow into legend" Alexander's Gas & Oil Connections. News & Trends: Central Asia. Volume 6, Issue #9, August 5, 2001.  
<http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc11939.htm> Viewed March 20, 2007.
- Kennan, George (writing as "X"). "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" Foreign Affairs. Volume 25, 1946-1947.
- Killgore, Andrew I. "Ideology Trumps Economic Efficiency, as The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Opens" The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. August 2005.
- Kimmage, Daniel. "Central Asia Provides Window on Russia-U.S. Relations." Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, RFE/RL Newslines, Volume 9, Number 36, End Note, February 24, 2005.
- Konstantin, Zatulín. "Vladimir Rushailo Tries to Forge a United Front." September 19, 2001. The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press. Volume 53, No. 38, October 17, 2001.
- Lambroschini, Sophie. "Russia: Putin's One Theme Is Firmness" Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 21, 2000.  
<http://www.rferl.org/features/2000/03/f.ru.000321142418.asp> Viewed February 16, 2007.
- Letter dated 5 October 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. UN Document A/49/475.
- Letter dated 14 March 1997 from the Permanent Representatives of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. UN Document A/52/93.
- Letter dated 11 December 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations address to the Secretary-General. UN Document A/53/741
- Lo, Bobo. "The Securitization of Russian Foreign Policy under Putin." Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century. Ed. Gabriel Gorodetsky. London and Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003.
- Lugar, Richard G. "Speech in Advance of NATO Summit" November 22, 2006.  
<http://www.lugar.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=266087> viewed December 7, 2006.

- Lukin, Vladimir P. "Our Security Predicament" Foreign Policy, Number 88 (Autumn, 1992), pp. 57-75.
- Madumarov, Adakhan. "Kyrgyz State Secretary Criticizes 'U.S.' Democracy" RFE/RL Newline Vol. 10, No. 225, Part I, 7 December 2006.
- Malta Summit Transcripts, December 2-3, 1989.  
<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/24/documents/malta/> viewed March 6, 2007.
- Manbiot, George. "A Discreet Deal In the Pipeline." The Guardian., February 15, 2001.  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,438134,00.html> viewed March 16, 2007.
- Mann, James. Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet. London: The Penguin Group, 2004.
- Mann, Steven R. "Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia," Testimony before the United States House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, July 25, 2006.
- McCain, John. Transcript of Interview with Chris Wallace, Fox News Sunday, February 28, 2005. <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,148875,00.html> viewed February 22, 2007.
- McMahon, Robert. "Central Asia: Russia and U.S. Often at Odds in Region." Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 25, 2005.  
<http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/10/cda56301-ff55-4a4f-b4ad-110d147d2df8.html> viewed March 5, 2007.
- Mehdiyoun, Kamyar. "Ownership of Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian Sea" The American Journal of International Law. January 2000; 94.
- Merzliakov, Iurii. "Legal Status of the Caspian." International Affairs: A Russian Journal. March 1999, p. 2. [http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/iarj/iarj\\_99mei01.html](http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/iarj/iarj_99mei01.html) viewed March 20, 2007.
- "Moscow Declaration" The 2<sup>nd</sup> Clinton-Yeltsin Summit, January 12-15, 1994, Moscow, Russia. <http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/summits2.htm> viewed February 1, 2007.
- "Moscow piles pressure on CPC over transit fees" Energy Compass. London: October 26, 2006.

- National Committee on American Foreign Policy. “Stability and Security in Central Asia: Engaging Kazakhstan,” August 2006. Michael Rywkin, Project Director.
- National Energy Policy Development Group. The National Energy Policy of the United States Government, May 2001. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf> viewed March 14, 2007.
- National Energy Policy Status Report on Implementation of NEP Recommendations. U.S. Department of Energy, January, 2005. <http://www.pi.energy.gov/documents/NEPImplementationReport012505.pdf> Viewed March 14, 2007.
- “Nazarbaev Outlines Kazakhstan Priorities” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 28, 2007. <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/02/1C4A7C31-90FE-49DA-B884-B55A92A6BD9E.html> viewed March 5, 2007.
- Nichol, Jim. “Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests” CRS Report for Congress. November 16, 2006.
- Nixon, Richard. Beyond Peace. New York: Random House, 1994.
- “No Go: Transneft Slams New Caspian Routes” NEFTE Compass. London: June 22, 2005.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Comprehensive Political Guidance” Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on November 29, 2006. <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/b061129e.htm> viewed December 7, 2006.
- Odom, William E. “Realism about Russia” The National Interest, Number 65 (Fall 2001).
- Olcott, Martha Brill. Central Asia’s Second Chance. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005.
- Panfilova, Viktoria and Mukhin Vladimir. “I’m Switching from Washington to Moscow.” June 30, 2005. The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press. Volume 57, No. 26, July 27, 2005.
- Pannier, Bruce. “Kazakhstan: President Tells West – We Don’t Need Your Advice” November 15, 2006. <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/11/FC8D6959-5ECA-4920-9AA0-630E18B2E352.html> viewed December 16, 2006.
- Pascoe, B. Lynn. “Uzbekistan: The Key to Success in Central Asia?” Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Central Asia House International Relations Committee, June 15, 2004. <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/33579.htm> viewed March 12, 2007.

- Petros, Tiffany. "Islam in Central Asia: The Emergence and Growth of Radicalism in the Post-Communist Era." In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Eds. Dan Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2004.
- Pipes, Richard. "Is Russia Still an Enemy?" Foreign Affairs. Volume 76, Number 5, September/October 1997.
- Powell, Colin L. Joint Press Conference with President Islam Karimov. Tashkent, Uzbekistan, December 8, 2001.  
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/dec/6749.htm>  
viewed February 20, 2007.
- , Remarks at Business Event in Shanghai, China. October 18, 2001.  
[http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept\\_11/powell\\_brief26.htm](http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/powell_brief26.htm) viewed February 18, 2007.
- , Statement on President Bush's Budget Request for FY2003, House International Relations Committee, Washington, D.C. February 6, 2002.  
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/7857.htm>  
Viewed October 5, 2006.
- Pravda, Alex. "Putin's Foreign Policy after 11 September: Radical or Revolutionary?" Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century. Ed. Gabriel Gorodetsky. London and Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003.
- Press Conference by President Bush and Russian Federation President Putin. Brdo Pri Kranju, Slovenia, June 16, 2001.  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010618.html> Viewed January 22, 2007.
- Press Conference with President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Shanghai, People's Republic of China, October 21, 2001.  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011021-3.html> viewed February 1, 2007.
- Primakov, Yevgeny M. A World Challenged: Fighting Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.
- "Primakov Welcomes SCO Statement" Interfax. July 7, 2005.

- Putin, Vladimir. Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.” April 25, 2005.  
[http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031\\_type70029type82912\\_87086.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml) viewed March 5, 2007.
- , “Putin Outlines Steps to Help U.S. in Antiterrorist War,” Complete text of speech given on Russian television, September 25, 2001. The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press. Volume 53, No. 39, October 24, 2001.
- , Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2007.  
[http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138\\_type82912type82914type82917type84779\\_118135.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118135.shtml) viewed February 12, 2007.
- Race, Glen. Interview with Terry Manzi. Caspian Crossroads Magazine, Number 1, Winter 1995.  
<http://ourworld.compuserve.com/HOMEPAGES/USAZERB/11.htm> viewed March 16, 2007.
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. RFE/RL Newslines, September 12, 2001  
<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2001/09/120901.asp#archive> viewed February 16, 2007.
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. RFE/RL Newslines, September 18, 2001.  
<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2001/09/1-RUS/rus-180901.asp#archive> viewed February 18, 2007.
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. RFE/RL Newslines, September 19, 2001.  
<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2001/09/1-RUS/rus-190901.asp#archive> viewed February 18, 2007.
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. RFE/RL Newslines, September 21, 2001.  
<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2001/09/1-RUS/rus-210901.asp#archive> viewed February 18, 2007.
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. “Russia Seeks ‘Clear Answers’ On Missile Defense.” March 6, 2007. <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/03/da22563c-3955-4f31-af92-b74fa6b1a483.html> viewed March 6, 2007.
- Rice, Condoleezza. “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest” Foreign Affairs. Volume 79, Number 1, January/February 2000.
- Roberts, John, Swann, Richard, and Rodova Nadia. “Patterns to link Kashagan to BTC pipeline.” Platt’s Oilgram News. June 9, 2006. Volume 84, Issue 110.

- Rodova, Nadia. "Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan leaders sign BTC pact" Platt's Oilgram News. June 19, 2006, Volume 84, Issue 116.
- Rumer, Boris. "Central Asia at the End of the Transition," Central Asia at the End of the Transition. Ed. Boris Rumer. Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2005.
- Rumsfeld, Donald. Transcript of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's and President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov's Joint Press Conference. Tashkent, Uzbekistan, October 5, 2001.  
<http://www.usembassy.uz/home/index.aspx?&=&mid=217&overview=534>  
viewed February 13, 2007.
- Sestanovich, Stephen. Edwards, John. Kemp, Jack. Russia's Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do. Council on Foreign Relations, Independent Task Force Report No. 57, 2006.
- Shakhnazaryan, Arthur. "They Should Expect a Tax Audit" Gazeta.kz January 26, 2007, Draft Translation from Russian.
- Simes, Dimitri K. "Clinton Must Talk Tough to the Russians" St. Louis Post, May 7, 1995, p. O3.B
- , "Realism: It's High Minded and It Works" The National Interest, Winter 2003/04.
- Socor, Vladimir. "Tashkent Asks U.S. to Close Air Base." Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 2, Number 150.  
[http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article\\_id=2370091](http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2370091) viewed February 24, 2007.
- , "The Unfolding of the U.S.-Uzbekistan Crisis" Anatomy of a Crisis: U.S.-Uzbekistan Relations, 2001-2005. Silk Road Paper: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, February 2006.
- Starr, S. Frederick. "Making Eurasia Stable" Foreign Affairs. Volume 75, Number 1, January/February 1996.
- Talbott, Strobe. The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy. New York: Random House, 2002.
- Tully, Andrew. "U.S.: What Is Strategy For Bases in Former Soviet Bloc?"  
<http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/12/7141A858-DD57-4691-9F77-06B3C78D17D6.html> viewed February 26, 2007.
- Tyson, Ann Scott. "Russia and China Bullying Central Asia, U.S. Says" The Washington Post, July 15, 2005, page A.19.

- United Nations General Assembly, Report to the Secretary-General. "Integration of the economies in transition into the world economy." August 16, 2006. A/61/269. Annex, Table 3.
- United States-Uzbekistan Signing Ceremony. Washington, D.C., March 12, 2002. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8735.htm> viewed February 1, 2007.
- "U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Russian Firm." Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Russian Foreign Policy and Security Watch, Volume 4, Number 38, September 25, 2003.
- "U.S. Wants to Put Radar in Caucasus." The New York Times, March 2, 2007. Page A6, World Briefing.
- "Vancouver Declaration" The 1<sup>st</sup> Clinton-Yeltsin Summit, April 3-4, 1993, Vancouver, Canada. <http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/summits1.htm> viewed January 31, 2007.
- Vice President's Remarks in a Press Availability with President Nursultan Nazarbayev of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Astana, Kazakhstan, May 5, 2006.
- Weitz, Richard. "Averting a New Great Game in Central Asia." The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2006, Volume 29, Number 3.
- Wolfowitz, Paul D. "Clinton's First Year" Foreign Affairs. Volume 73, Number 1, January/February 1994.
- Woodward, Bob. Bush at War. Simon & Schuster, 2002.
- Yasmann, Victor. "Russia: Kremlin Sees Its Foreign-Policy Star On Rise" Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 21, 2007. <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/03/2e6ae5fc-18c5-4150-85a2-91dde1e4e823.html> viewed March 21, 2007.
- Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: The Free Press, 1991.
- Zuckerman, Mortimer B. "The Big Game Gets Bigger" U.S. News & World Report, May 10, 1999. Volume 126, Issue 18.